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AMERICAN EQUAL PROTECTION 
AND GLOBAL CONVERGENCE 
Holning Lau* & Hillary Li** 
 
 Commentators have noted that equal protection doctrine is in a state of 
transformation.  The nature of that transformation, however, is poorly 
understood.  This Article offers a clearer view of the change underway.  This 
Article is the first to reveal and synthesize three major trajectories along 
which the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to move.  First, the Court has begun 
to blur the line that it previously drew between facial discrimination and 
disparate impact.  Second, the Court has begun to collapse its previously 
established tiered standards for reviewing discrimination.  These two 
trajectories combine to produce a third trajectory of change:  by blurring the 
distinction between facial discrimination and disparate impact, and by 
collapsing tiered review, the United States’ equal protection doctrine is 
converging with equality jurisprudence from peer jurisdictions abroad. 
After describing these changes, we argue that the collective wisdom of 
foreign jurisdictions should serve as persuasive authority encouraging the 
United States to continue along its current trajectories of doctrinal reform.  
We contend that foreign jurisdictions have served as laboratories of doctrinal 
innovation from which the United States could learn. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the U.S. Supreme Court reverses course on constitutional doctrine, 
it usually happens through evolution, not revolution.  This was true, for 
example, when the Court abandoned its previously vigorous protection of 
freedom of contract during the so-called Lochner era.1  The Court departed 
from precedent by moving slowly over a series of cases.2  Similarly, the 
Court’s precedents condoning racial segregation had begun to fray long 
before the Court explicitly rejected the doctrine of separate but equal.3  These 
are just some examples demonstrating that constitutional law in the United 
States changes through small steps, much like the common law.4 
Because changes to constitutional law develop slowly over time, they can 
be difficult to detect in real time.  Indeed, three emerging trajectories in the 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence have received little scholarly 
attention.5  This Article is the first to synthesize these developments and 
discuss their theoretical and practical significance. 
 
 1. The most frequently discussed, and criticized, example of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
formerly strong protection of contractual freedom is Lochner. See Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905) (invalidating a labor law that set maximum work hours for violating 
freedom of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).  For background on the Court’s 
gradual repudiation of the constitutional right to freedom of contract, see DAVID P. CURRIE, 
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:  THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888–1986, at 210–14 
(1990). 
 2. This departure began with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 538 (1934), which 
upheld a law fixing the price of milk, and fully crystallized in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 
726, 732–33 (1963), which upheld a prohibition on the business of debt adjusting. 
 3. We borrow the imagery of precedents “fraying” from David A. Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 902 (1996).  Before the Court explicitly 
rejected racial segregation in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court 
had issued many decisions that were inconsistent with the doctrine of separate but equal. See 
generally McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Gaines v. Canada, 305 
U.S. 337 (1938).  For discussion on how these cases led up to Brown, see Louis Michael 
Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 699–708 (1992). 
 4. For another example of how constitutional doctrine changes slowly like the common 
law, see Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”:  Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1461–72 
(2000) (describing constitutional sex discrimination doctrine).  For a foundational text on the 
similarities between constitutional law and common law, see generally Strauss, supra note 3. 
 5. While some commentators have identified particular points along these emerging 
trajectories, this Article presents a fuller view of them.  For elaborations on relevant existing 
scholarship, see infra notes 30, 34, 165 and accompanying text.   
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The first two developments that we explore involve the Court distancing 
itself from longstanding equal protection doctrine.  First, the Court has 
blurred the line that it once rigidly maintained between cases of facial 
discrimination and disparate impact.6  Second, the Court has begun to 
collapse its tiered framework for reviewing equal protection cases.7  These 
two trends come together to form a third trajectory, which is the growing 
convergence between American equal protection doctrine and equal 
protection doctrine around the world.8  By blurring the distinction between 
facial discrimination and disparate impact cases and by collapsing tiered 
review in equal protection cases, the Supreme Court has aligned American 
jurisprudence more closely with jurisprudence abroad. 
These three emerging trajectories all carry great significance.  Indeed, they 
may become dispositive in Supreme Court decisions on cases currently 
finding their way to the Court.  The growing global convergence should also 
prompt commentators to revisit heated debates about whether, and how, the 
Court engages with foreign sources of law.9 
Consider, first, the distinction between facial discrimination and disparate 
impact.  The Court has long drawn a line between laws that overtly 
discriminate (facial discrimination cases) and facially neutral laws that 
adversely affect particular groups of people (disparate impact cases).10  In its 
equal protection jurisprudence, the Court has traditionally found facial 
discrimination cases to be much more troubling.11  Recently, however, the 
Supreme Court has begun to blur the line between facial discrimination and 
disparate impact.12 
 
 6. Facial discrimination cases challenge laws that overtly discriminate against a group of 
people, whereas disparate impact cases challenge laws that are technically neutral but 
disproportionately affect a group of people in adverse ways. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 698, 740–51 (5th ed. 2015). 
 7. As a de jure matter, the Court has applied three tiers of scrutiny in equal protection 
cases:  rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.  For background 
reading on this tiered system, see id. at 699–702.  Many commentators, however, contend that 
the Court has developed additional de facto tiers of review. See infra Part I.B. 
 8. For background reading on comparative approaches to equality law, see generally 
DAVID B. OPPENHEIMER, SHEILA R. FOSTER & SORA Y. HAN, COMPARATIVE EQUALITY AND 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW:  CASES, CODES, CONSTITUTIONS, AND COMMENTARY (2012). 
 9. Emblematic of this debate is the disagreement between Justice Breyer and the late 
Justice Antonin Scalia.  Justice Scalia was a frequent and vocal opponent of citing foreign law.  
In contrast, Justice Breyer has written extensive defenses of citing foreign laws and has 
advocated that position during many public speaking engagements. See Robert Barnes, 
Breyer:  Fears of Foreign Law Don’t Resonate, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2015, at A3 (discussing 
debate among Supreme Court Justices on the appropriateness of citing foreign law). 
 10. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), is a classic case in which the Court 
distinguished facial discrimination and disparate impact; it concluded that cases of disparate 
impact generally do not require vigorous scrutiny. Id. at 238–48. 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 238–48.  This Article’s focus is constitutional law, not civil rights 
statutes.  In some statutory areas, the Court has been much more willing to find impermissible 
discrimination based on disparate impact. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015) (discussing the Fair Housing Act); 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428–29 (1971) (discussing Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964).  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also explicitly makes disparate impact 
claims of employment discrimination colorable. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
 12. See infra Part I. 
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Whether the Court continues down the path of conflating these two 
categories of cases will influence pending litigation.  Consider, for example, 
the current case challenging North Carolina’s law that strips municipalities 
of power to enact antidiscrimination ordinances.13  On its face, the statute 
does not discriminate.  In restricting local governments’ ability to enact 
antidiscrimination ordinances, the law does not overtly categorize people for 
differential treatment.14  Yet, this facially neutral ban on local 
antidiscrimination ordinances uniquely impacts lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) communities.15  Unlike other groups that are protected 
by federal civil rights laws—such as women and persons of color—LGBT 
communities in North Carolina have had to rely on local ordinances in 
progressive regions of the state for protection.16  Local governments are now 
prohibited from passing any new antidiscrimination measures for at least 
three years.17  Whether and how the Court distinguishes between facial 
discrimination and disparate impact are questions that will influence 
litigation challenging this restriction on antidiscrimination protections. 
The litigation concerning North Carolina will also turn, in part, on the 
standard of review adopted in the case.18  Traditionally, the Supreme Court 
has applied three levels of review in equal protection cases:  strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.19  Some scholars believe that 
the Court has opaquely developed a fourth standard of review, often referred 
 
 13. In 2016, North Carolina enacted the Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act of 2016, 
which is commonly referred to as House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”). See H.R. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 
2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016).  In addition to requiring transgender people to use public restrooms 
that comport with their assigned sex at birth, the law preempted local antidiscrimination 
ordinances. Id.  In 2017, North Carolina repealed H.B. 2 and replaced it with House Bill 142 
(“H.B. 142”). H.R. 142, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017).  H.B. 142 preempts any 
local ordinance that regulates restroom access, including transgender people’s right of access. 
Id.  It also prohibits local governments from passing any other types of antidiscrimination 
protections until December 1, 2020. Id.  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and 
Lambda Legal filed litigation challenging H.B. 2. See Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief para. 1, Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (No. 
1:16-cv-00236), 2016 WL 1213004 para. 1.  These organizations later filed an amended 
complaint to challenge H.B. 142 as well. See Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint para. 1, 
Carcaño v. McCrory, No. 1:16-cv-00236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. July 21, 2017).  The U.S. 
Department of Justice also challenged H.B. 2, but not the part of the law that preempted local 
ordinances. See United States v. North Carolina, 192 F. Supp. 3d 620, 622–23 (M.D.N.C. 
2016). 
 14. See H.R. 142; H.R. 2; see also infra Part III.C. 
 15. The North Carolina bills are distinguishable from the facially discriminatory Colorado 
constitutional amendment that prohibited local governments from having antidiscrimination 
laws that explicitly protect gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. See Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996). 
 16. See Jeff Tiberii, Sifting Through the Facts on House Bill 2, WUNC (Apr. 1, 2016), 
http://wunc.org/post/sifting-through-facts-house-bill-2 [https://perma.cc/LP7U-FY8B] 
(listing local antidiscrimination measures that existed prior to North Carolina’s moratorium 
on such measures). 
 17. See supra note 13. 
 18. See supra note 13. 
 19. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 699–702. 
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to by commentators as “rational basis review with bite.”20  Other scholars 
interpret case law to contain even more de facto tiers.21  We contend, 
however, that a better reading of recent cases is that the Court has 
functionally eschewed its tiered framework and is converging upon a new 
form of intermediate scrutiny that applies to all cases involving 
discrimination based on personal characteristics.22  In gay rights cases, the 
Court has ratcheted up rational basis review so that it functions more like 
intermediate scrutiny.23  Meanwhile, in at least one recent race discrimination 
case, the Court ratcheted down strict scrutiny so that it functions as strict 
scrutiny in name only and as intermediate scrutiny in effect.24 
To be clear, blurring of the distinction between facial discrimination and 
disparate impact and the collapse of tiered review are still in the early stages.  
Change is afoot.25  At this juncture, it is helpful to look abroad because many 
 
 20. E.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–24 (1972); Jeremy B. 
Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite:  Why the Supreme Court Should 
Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classes Based on Sexual Orientation, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2773–74 (2005) (arguing that while the Supreme Court has applied 
rational basis with bite to sexual-orientation discrimination, it has not done so explicitly and 
thus has left lower courts confused). 
 21. E.g., James E. Fleming, “There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause”:  An 
Appreciation of Justice Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 
2304–10 (2006) (contending that there are at least six tiers); Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell, 
Fisher, and the Inversion of Tiers, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2017) (identifying five 
tiers). 
22. As we explain in Part I.B, this Article focuses on cases involving discrimination based 
on personal characteristics that are usually difficult to change, with race, sex, and sexual-
orientation discrimination serving as paradigmatic examples.  We refrain from examining how 
the Court will treat discrimination based on other characteristics, such as the differential 
treatment of licensed optometrists and ophthalmologists versus unlicensed opticians. See 
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1955).  We limit our analysis to the 
first category of cases because they have been the focus of the Court’s recent jurisprudence 
and our aim is to examine the consequences of recent developments.  We note that personal 
traits might be difficult to change for a variety of reasons including biological constraints or 
the fact that the change would require a large compromise to one’s sense of self.  The Supreme 
Court has said that race, sex, and sexual orientation are all “immutable” personal 
characteristics, but it has not defined immutability.  See Jessica A. Clarke, Against 
Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 34 n.168 (2015) (explaining that the Court’s usage of the term 
“immutability” in Obergefell was unclear); infra note 141 and accompanying text.  Some 
lower courts have said that an immutable trait is not necessarily unchangeable but is at least 
difficult to change. See Clarke, supra, at 34–35.  Other courts have expanded the definition of 
immutability by stating that a trait should be considered immutable whenever it would be 
unfair to ask someone to change that aspect of themselves. See id. at 25–26, 35–36; see also 
Edward Stein, Immutability and Innateness Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual 
Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 635 (2014) (critiquing courts’ capacious definition of 
“immutability” because it “is just not immutability in the standard sense of the term”). 
 23. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 583–84 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 
(1996); infra Part I.B (discussing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)). 
 24. See infra Part I.B (discussing Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 
(2016)). 
 25. In our constitutional system, old doctrines erode slowly while new ones crystallize 
over time. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 935 (“Gradual innovation, in the hope of improvement, 
has always been a part of the common law tradition, as it has been a part of American 
constitutionalism.”). 
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foreign peers long ago bridged the divide between facial discrimination and 
disparate impact and have forgone using multiple tiers of review in equal 
protection cases.26  Drawing on theories about collective wisdom, we contend 
that the experiences of foreign jurisdictions give us good reason to believe 
that the Supreme Court is on the right path and should stay its course.27  
Moreover, as we explain below, foreign jurisdictions are laboratories of 
doctrinal experimentation from which the United States should learn.28  
While the Supreme Court should not blindly follow foreign trends, it should 
view foreign jurisdictions as helpful sources of information.29 
This Article proceed as follows.  Parts I and II are primarily descriptive in 
nature.  Part I traces the gradual blurring of the distinction between facial 
discrimination and disparate impact and the collapsing of tiered review in the 
United States.30  Part II examines equal protection abroad and focuses 
specifically on Canada, South Africa, the Council of Europe, and Hong 
Kong.  We chose the first three of these jurisdictions because comparativists 
commonly view them as leading case studies.31  We added Hong Kong to our 
analysis because it has recently addressed the equal protection questions that 
we study.32  It also has a legal system that is familiar to, and respected by, 
many American lawyers.33  Part II identifies convergences between these 
jurisdictions’ laws and recent developments in American equal protection 
jurisprudence.  These are convergences that have, until now, been overlooked 
in the scholarly literature.34 
 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part III.B. 
 28. See infra Part III.C. 
 29. See Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution:  
Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 353 (2004). Levinson states: 
One obviously need not believe that there is an obligation to be bound by . . . foreign 
experience—indeed, I know of no one who makes such a foolish argument—in order 
to believe that it is simply prudent practice to become knowledgeable about such 
experience and to apply the lessons one finds there to comparable dilemmas facing 
us here in the United States. 
Id. 
 30. Other commentators have identified some of the specific data points that comprise 
these developments. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity:  Speaking Its Name, 129 
HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 19 (2015) (noting that dicta in Obergefell helps to blur the line between 
facial discrimination and disparate impact).  This Article builds on those insights by discussing 
how various data points come together to form major trajectories of change. 
 31. Canada, South Africa, and the Council of Europe (i.e., the European Court of Human 
Rights) have developed reputations for respecting the rule of law and producing court opinions 
that are frequently cited across borders because of their persuasive reasoning. See infra notes 
224–26 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 34. This is the first Article to focus squarely on convergences between U.S. equal 
protection doctrine and global developments.  Other commentators have written about other 
aspects of global convergence. See, e.g., David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and 
Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1187–90 (2011) (reporting on 
empirical data that show convergences among written constitutions); Jud Mathews & Alec 
Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion?  American Rights Review and the Problem of 
Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 803 (2011) (arguing that dormant Commerce Clause 
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Part III takes a prescriptive turn.  It discusses what the developments 
described in Part II should mean for the future of American constitutional 
law.  In this Part, we suggest that, while foreign law certainly is not binding 
on the United States, the experiences of foreign jurisdictions should 
encourage the United States to continue bridging the divide between facial 
discrimination and disparate impact and to continue collapsing tiered review.  
Moreover, we contend that future Supreme Court opinions should engage 
with foreign law more directly and transparently.  Doing so would enhance 
the strength and clarity of the Court’s reasoning. 
Finally, the Conclusion contextualizes this Article’s claims by situating 
them before the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s shifting composition.  With 
Justice Gorsuch’s recent appointment to the Court and the possibility of other 
Supreme Court Justices leaving it soon, our conclusion will explore what the 
Court’s future composition may mean for the jurisprudential trajectories 
currently underway.35 
I.  EMERGING TRAJECTORIES IN 
AMERICAN EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE 
The common law often “decides the case first and determines the principle 
afterwards,” observed Oliver Wendell Holmes.36  “It is only after a series of 
determinations on the same subject-matter, that it becomes necessary . . . by 
a true induction[,] to state the principle which has until then been obscurely 
felt.”37 
Constitutional scholars have since observed that, like the common law, 
constitutional doctrine also emerges from inductive reasoning that connects 
the dots among earlier cases.38  In this Part, we build on that tradition.  We 
draw from recent equal protection cases to reveal two emerging trajectories 
in doctrinal reform.  American equal protection doctrine has long been 
characterized by two components:  (1) the distinction between facial 
discrimination and disparate impact and (2) tiered levels of judicial 
scrutiny.39  Both of these components have begun to fray.  These changes can 
be difficult to see, however, because they are happening beneath the surface 
 
jurisprudence and aspects of various forms of U.S. constitutional review converge with the 
“proportionality analysis” commonly engaged in by foreign courts). 
 35. See Kermit Roosevelt III & Patricia Stottlemyer, The Fight for Equal Protection:  
Reconstruction-Redemption Redux, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 36, 36 (2016) (discussing the 
possibility of a major change in the Court’s composition). 
 36. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1870). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 845, 860–75 (2007) (discussing the inductive reasoning behind landmark 
constitutional decisions including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). 
 39. For an overview of these aspects of equal protection, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, 
at 751–823; infra notes 41–62, 134–48 and accompanying text. 
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of recent judicial opinions.40  The following discussion seeks to bring these 
changes to light. 
To be clear, we make no claim about whether Supreme Court Justices have 
been consciously blurring the distinction between facial discrimination and 
disparate impact, or consciously collapsing the tiered levels of scrutiny.  The 
Justices may have been focused on particularities of specific cases, and these 
cases may relate to each other and constitute trajectories that the Justices did 
not envision.  Nonetheless, we submit that we can make logical sense of 
recent equal protection cases by identifying, through induction, the emerging 
doctrinal trajectories discussed below. 
A.  Blurring the Line Between 
Facial Discrimination and Disparate Impact 
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has begun to blur the line between 
facial discrimination and disparate impact.  Before examining these recent 
cases, it is helpful to review earlier cases that established the distinction 
between these two types of cases.  The 1973 decision in Frontiero v. 
Richardson41 is a good place to start.  In Frontiero, the plaintiffs challenged 
a spousal-benefits policy for military personnel and alleged that it 
impermissibly discriminated based on sex.42  The entire Court easily 
answered the threshold question whether there was sex discrimination at 
issue because the policy explicitly distinguished men from women and 
treated them differently in determining spousal benefits.43  In other words, 
there was facial discrimination.  The plurality subjected this facial 
discrimination to heightened scrutiny and struck down the personnel 
policy.44 
The following year, in the case of Geduldig v. Aiello,45 Carolyn Aiello and 
three other women challenged the State of California’s insurance fund for 
employees with temporary disabilities because it excluded from coverage all 
disabilities resulting from pregnancy.46  The plaintiffs alleged that this 
exclusion amounted to unconstitutional sex discrimination.47  California’s 
law, however, was facially neutral with respect to sex.48  The law did not treat 
women as a class of people but instead impacted certain women based on the 
condition of pregnancy.49  In light of these circumstances, the Court adopted 
 
 40. This phenomenon is similar to changes in the common law, which Holmes described 
as “obscurely felt.” See Holmes, supra note 36, at 1. 
 41. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 42. Id. at 680 (plurality opinion). 
 43. Id. at 689–90; id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 689–90 (plurality opinion).  A majority of the Court later agreed in Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), that sex discrimination receives heightened scrutiny. Id. at 197.  
This Article uses “heightened scrutiny” as an umbrella term referring to standards of judicial 
scrutiny that are more stringent than rational basis review. 
 45. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 46. Id. at 486–90. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 496–97. 
 49. Id. 
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a narrow and formalistic definition of discrimination.  Because the insurance 
policy did not facially ban either sex from coverage, the Court decided that 
the insurance policy did not discriminate based on sex.50 
Geduldig barely acknowledged that California’s disability policy 
adversely impacted women.51  The Court was also unclear about whether 
disparate impact could ever count as discrimination that triggers heightened 
scrutiny.52  In Washington v. Davis,53 however, the Court took the 
opportunity to elaborate on the difference between facial discrimination and 
disparate impact.54  In Davis, two African Americans who applied to join the 
Washington, D.C., police force challenged a written personnel test for 
screening applicants.55  Neither the test nor the requirement to take the test 
overtly differentiated between applicants based on race.56  The plaintiffs, 
however, argued that the test bore no relationship to job performance and that 
it disproportionately prevented African Americans from joining the force.57  
The Court ruled against them and held that disparate racial impact does not 
trigger the strict scrutiny applied to overt racial discrimination unless 
plaintiffs can show that the government was motivated by “discriminatory 
intent”58 or, put differently, “invidious discriminatory purpose.”59 
The Court later clarified in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney60 that plaintiffs must prove that the government enacted a policy 
“‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.”61  With this requirement, the Court defined discriminatory purpose 
so narrowly that it has become virtually impossible to prove.62  State actors 
that harbor malicious intent can easily offer pretexts that mask invidious 
motives, leaving opponents with the uphill battle of proving that the proffered 
reasons for a law were pretextual.63 
In short, the Court’s jurisprudence has created two categories of cases.  The 
first category involves laws that facially discriminate.  Laws that facially 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. The Court briefly acknowledged that “only women can become pregnant.” Id. at 496 
n.20.  It still concluded, however, that “[t]he California insurance program does not exclude 
anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical 
condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities.” Id. 
 52. The Court did suggest, briefly in a footnote, that it would be unconstitutional for 
lawmakers to use “distinctions involving pregnancy . . . [as] mere pretexts designed to affect 
an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.” Id. at 496 n.20. 
 53. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
 54. See id. at 238–48.  
 55. Id. at 233. 
 56. Id. at 235. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 237. 
 59. Id. at 242.  
 60. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 61. Id. at 258 (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to preferential treatment granted to 
veterans despite its adverse impact on women). 
 62. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 764 (2011) 
(“In the vast run of cases after Feeney, only facial discrimination has drawn heightened 
scrutiny under the equal protection guarantees.”). 
 63. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 386–90 (2007) 
(describing the difficulty of satisfying Feeney’s requirement of proving malice). 
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discriminate based on certain characteristics, such as race and sex, trigger 
rigorous judicial review.  The second category of cases involves laws that are 
facially neutral but create disparate impacts.  Cases in this second category 
almost never receive rigorous judicial scrutiny because of the requirement 
that plaintiffs must prove invidious intent for alleged disparate impact to 
receive that review.64  A technically neutral law or government policy is 
likely to receive minimal judicial review no matter how egregiously it affects 
traditionally subordinated groups, such as women or people of color.65 
The wall that the Supreme Court constructed between disparate impact and 
facial discrimination in constitutional cases has long frustrated civil rights 
advocates.66  This is not only because invidious intentions can be masked by 
pretext but also because laws with harmful discriminatory effects may arise 
from unconscious biases.67  This wall, however, has developed significant 
cracks.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor put the first crack in the wall in her 
concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,68 even though little attention was 
drawn to the blow she delivered.69  Although she did not mention Geduldig 
explicitly, her reasoning in Lawrence contrasts sharply with that of the earlier 
opinion.70 
Lawrence addressed Texas’s criminalization of same-sex sodomy.71  The 
majority struck down the law based on substantive due process,72 but Justice 
O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she rejected the criminal 
prohibition based on equal protection; she found that the sodomy ban 
impermissibly discriminated based on sexual orientation.73  From early in the 
litigation, however, there was debate over the threshold question whether the 
statute actually discriminated based on sexual orientation.74  Just as not all 
women are, or ever will become, pregnant, not all gay men engage in same-
 
 64. It is worth noting that, prior to the Supreme Court distinguishing facial discrimination 
from disparate impact in equal protection cases, many lower courts rigorously scrutinized 
racial disparate impact without first requiring plaintiffs to prove invidious intent. See Reva B. 
Siegel, Foreword:  Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2013) (discussing lower-
court disparate impact cases from the 1960s and 1970s). 
 65. See id. at 47–48 (“Because it is extremely difficult to prove discriminatory purpose 
and nearly always possible to find some reason for a government policy with a racial disparate 
impact other than a purpose to harm the group, the Davis-Feeney framework allows courts to 
immunize most government action against equal protection challenge.”); Yoshino, supra note 
62, at 764 (“If legislators have the wit—which they generally do—to avoid words like ‘race’ 
or the name of a particular racial group in the text of their legislation, the courts will generally 
apply ordinary rational basis review.”).  
 66. See Johnson, supra note 63, at 375 n.5 (listing articles that have criticized the limited 
scope of colorable disparate impact claims). 
 67. For a discussion on the pervasiveness of biases that people hold unconsciously, also 
known as implicit biases, see Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness:  
Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 465–89 (2010).  
 68. 539 U.S. 558 (2005).  
 69. See id. at 583–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. at 562 (majority opinion). 
 72. See id. at 572. 
 73. See id. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 74. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App. 2001), rev’d, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
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sex sodomy.75  Meanwhile, the lower state court in Texas explained:  
“Persons having a predominately heterosexual inclination may sometimes 
engage in homosexual conduct.  Thus, the statute’s proscription applies, 
facially at least, without respect to a defendant’s sexual orientation.”76 
Justice O’Connor rejected the idea that the statute did not discriminate 
based on sexual orientation.77  She did not resort to analyzing motive as 
required by Washington v. Davis.78  Indeed, she said nothing about the 
motive behind Texas’s sodomy ban.  Instead, she tersely stated that engaging 
in same-sex sodomy is “closely correlated with being homosexual” and, 
therefore, that the law is discriminatory.79  Put differently, Justice 
O’Connor’s conclusion stems from the nature of the law’s impact on 
homosexuals, regardless of the law’s motivations. 
Obergefell v. Hodges,80 the case that struck down states’ same-sex 
marriage bans, further blurred the line between facial discrimination and 
discriminatory impact.  Opponents of same-sex marriage have long argued 
that banning same-sex marriage does not discriminate based on sexual 
orientation, and some judges have endorsed this reasoning.81  In this view, 
same-sex marriage bans are facially neutral with respect to sexual orientation 
because they prohibit both gay and straight people from marrying partners of 
the same sex; meanwhile, gay and straight people alike have the right to 
marry someone of the opposite sex.82  Obergefell, however, did not even 
bother to address that the law technically treated gay and straight individuals 
the same.83 
Despite the facial neutrality of same-sex marriage bans,84 Obergefell held 
that excluding same-sex couples from marriage violated not only due process 
 
 75. Commentators have long noted the fact that discourse on gay identity often wrongly 
conflates conduct (sodomy) with status (being gay). See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating 
Criminals:  The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Law, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 
103, 174–77 (2000). 
 76. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 353.   
 77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 78. For our earlier discussion of Washington v. Davis’s motive-based requirement, see 
supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text. 
 79. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583–84. 
 80. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 81. See Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1004 (D. Nev. 2012); In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 465 (Cal. 2008) (Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 521 n.11 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J., 
dissenting); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 362–63 (D.C. 1995) (Steadman, J., 
concurring); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n.11 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 975 (Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissenting); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 
N.E.2d 1, 20 (N.Y. 2006) (Graffeo, J., concurring); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 
997 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson, J., concurring). 
 82. For further discussion of this rationale, see generally Peter Nicolas, Gay Rights, Equal 
Protection, and the Classification-Framing Quandary, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329 (2014). 
 83. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
 84. To be sure, same-sex marriage bans are facially discriminatory with respect to couples.  
The bans treat same-sex couples and different-sex couples differently.  Yet, for the reasons 
described above, the bans are technically neutral with respect to gays and lesbians as 
individuals.  Note that Obergefell did not focus on the facial discrimination against same-sex 
couples; it was ultimately concerned about the bans’ adverse impact on gays and lesbians 
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but also equal protection.85  In its equal protection analysis, the Court was 
troubled by same-sex marriage bans’ adverse impact on gays and lesbians, 
regardless of whether there was invidious intent underlying the bans.86  The 
Court never stated that same-sex marriage bans were motivated by 
invidiousness.87  To the contrary, the Court stated that “[m]any who deem 
same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and 
honorable religious or philosophical premises.”88  The Court also stated that 
the “nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.”89  
This implied that the state’s traditional exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marriage was probably not consciously motivated by a desire to harm gays 
and lesbians because, until recently, such harm was not understood. 
Rather than focusing on intent, the Court focused on impact.  The Court 
started by asserting that the fundamental right to marry encompasses the right 
to marry a partner of the same sex.90  Instead of mechanistically stating that 
infringing fundamental rights triggers strict scrutiny,91 the Court elaborated 
on the ways in which marriage bans harm gays and lesbians and their 
families.92  The Court explained that the bans inflict potential tangible harms, 
such as financial insecurity, upon same-sex couples and their children.93  The 
Court further explained that barring same-sex marriage “demeans,”94 
“disrespect[s,] and “subordinate[s]”95 gays and lesbians.  After fleshing out 
these adverse impacts, the Court concluded that same-sex marriage bans 
violate equal protection.96 
 
generally.  It emphasized that banning same-sex marriage inflicts “disability on gays and 
lesbians [and] serves to disrespect and subordinate them.” Id. at 2604.  In other writing, one 
of us has argued that facial discrimination against same-sex couples should, in and of itself, 
be considered a form of impermissible discrimination. See generally Holning Lau, 
Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1271 (2006).  Additionally, commentators have argued that, although same-
sex marriage bans are facially neutral with respect to sexual orientation, they are facially 
discriminatory with respect to sex. See generally Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination 
Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 397 (2001).  Obergefell, however, did not adopt 
this line of reasoning. 
 85. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–604. 
 86. See id. at 2602–12. 
 87. See generally id.  
 88. See id. at 2602 (emphasis added).  The Court also said, with respect to opponents of 
same-sex marriage, that “neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged [in this decision].” Id. 
 89. Id. at 2598. 
 90. Id. at 2604–05. 
 91. For an example of an older case where the Court reasoned mechanistically that 
infringing the fundamental right to marry triggers heightened scrutiny, see Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374, 383, 388 (1978) (discussing the marriage rights of noncustodial parents who 
owe child support).  For an example of a lower court adopting this mechanistic review more 
recently, see Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375 (4th Cir. 2014) (reasoning mechanistically 
that denying the fundamental right to marry triggers strict scrutiny in equal protection 
analysis). 
 92. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–04. 
 93. Id. at 2601 (discussing marriage rights’ relation to taxation, inheritance, survivorship, 
and other property rights). 
 94. Id. at 2602. 
 95. Id. at 2604. 
 96. Id. 
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In recent scholarship, other commentators have observed that the Court 
has integrated liberty and equality analyses in cases such as Obergefell.97  
This integration comports with our claim that the Court is concerned about 
impact in equality cases:  the Court’s attention to liberty is essentially 
attention to impact.  By recognizing that a fundamental liberty was at stake—
not just an ordinary liberty interest—Obergefell underscored the gravity of 
the adverse impact of same-sex marriage bans.98 
We can compare Obergefell with the Geduldig case discussed earlier.  
Geduldig concluded that there was no sex discrimination because not all 
women are, or ever will be, pregnant.99  In contrast, Obergefell was much 
less concerned about the fact that some gays and lesbians are neither 
interested nor ever will be interested in getting married.100  Obergefell did 
not bother grappling with this facially neutral element of same-sex marriage 
bans.101  It focused instead on discriminatory impact, and such analysis of 
impact was missing from Geduldig.102 
The most recent case to suggest the Court has begun to conflate facial 
discrimination and disparate impact is Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin 
(Fisher II).103  Fisher II involved a challenge to an admissions policy at the 
University of Texas that filled around 25 percent of its incoming class each 
year by reviewing applicants holistically and taking into account numerous 
factors, including race.104  Abigail Fisher, a white applicant who was denied 
admission, argued that this process violated equal protection because it 
overtly considered candidates’ race.105  She believed that the University 
could have, and should have, recruited a diverse student body through means 
other than overt considerations of race.106  Specifically, she argued that the 
University should have expanded the number of students that it admitted 
through its “percentage plan” approach.107  Under its existing percentage 
plan, the University admitted all students who graduated from a Texas high 
school in the top ten percent of their class.108  Because Texas high schools 
 
 97. E.g., Tribe, supra note 30, at 29–32; Yoshino, supra note 62, at 748. 
 98. See Obergefell, 136 S. Ct. at 2602–04. 
 99. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n. 20 (1974). 
 100. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text. 
 102. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text. 
 103. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).  After Fisher II, the Court has decided a few equal protection 
cases that did not shed any new light on the relationship between facial discrimination and 
disparate impact.  For example, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017), was a 
case of facial sex discrimination, which did not require the Court to elaborate on the 
relationship between facial discrimination and disparate impact. Id. at 1697–98.  Likewise, the 
Court decided the race discrimination case of Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017), in 
which the Court did not focus its attention on the significance of discriminatory impact. See 
id.  Instead, the Court found that lawmakers were impermissibly motivated by race when they 
drew legislative districts. Id. at 1481–82.  The Court found that lawmakers impermissibly 
packed black voters into a few legislative districts to diminish the power of black voters. Id. 
 104. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2206. 
 105. Id. at 2207. 
 106. Id. at 2212. 
 107. Id. at 2213. 
 108. Id. at 2205. 
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tend to be racially segregated, the percentage plan had the effect of ensuring 
a racially heterogeneous group of admitted students, even though the 
percentage plan was facially neutral.109  Fisher argued that expanding the 
percentage plan approach to admissions would be preferable to the 
University’s current approach, which admitted 25 percent of each incoming 
class through a holistic review process that considered race.110 
The Court rejected Abigail Fisher’s contention and stated that expanding 
the percentage plan would not make the University’s admissions program 
more race neutral in spirit.111  This was because “boost[ing] minority 
enrollment” was a goal undergirding the percentage plan.112  Thus, the Court 
likened the facially race-neutral percentage plan to the overtly race-conscious 
holistic review.  Previously, the Court had only likened disparate impact to 
facial discrimination when the government sought to use a facially neutral 
law in invidious ways.113  Fisher II further blurs the line between facial 
discrimination and disparate impact.  In this case, the Court drew a close 
comparison between facial discrimination (in the holistic review program) 
and disparate impact (from the percentage plan), even though the motivations 
behind the disparate impact were benevolent, not malicious.114 
Fisher II might lead courts to consider facial discrimination and disparate 
impact similarly in future cases.  For example, the State of North Carolina 
argued that its controversial “bathroom bill,” commonly referred to as 
H.B. 2,115 did not discriminate against individuals based on gender identity 
because, regardless of whether an individual is transgender or cisgender, the 
law required the individual to use a restroom that corresponds to the 
individual’s assigned sex at birth.116  This formalistic reasoning is troubling 
because transgender people face particular adversity when forced to use a 
restroom that corresponds with their birth sex as opposed to their gender 
identity.117  In other words, even though H.B. 2 was facially neutral with 
 
 109. Id. at 2213. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Indeed, commentators have interpreted Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), as requiring legislative malice in order for disparate impact to 
trigger the same judicial review as facial discrimination. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 63, at 
388; Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:  The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (1997). 
 114. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213. 
 115. According to H.B. 2, individuals who wish to use single-sex restrooms at public 
agencies and public schools must use the restroom that comports with their biological sex 
assigned at birth. See H.R. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016); supra notes 13–
15 and accompanying text.  
 116. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee and Intervenor/Defendants-Appellees at 36 n.11, 
Carcaño v. McCrory, No. 16-1989 (4th Cir., dismissed Nov. 21, 2016) (“HB2 does not 
‘facially’ discriminate against transgender people; it ‘facially’ classifies everyone on the basis 
of biological characteristics.”).   
 117. Compared with cisgender people, transgender people who are forced to use restrooms 
that correspond with their birth sex face a unique risk of being denied access and being 
harassed or assaulted. See generally Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms and Minority 
Stress:  The Public Regulation of Gender and Its Impact on Transgender People’s Lives, 16 J. 
PUB. MGMT. & SOC. POL’Y 65 (2013). For discussion of the “growing push by state legislators 
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respect to gender identity, it created adverse effects based on gender identity.  
North Carolina, however, asserted that the motivation behind H.B. 2 was not 
to subordinate transgender people but rather to achieve the benevolent goal 
of protecting the privacy expected by cisgender people.118  Assuming 
arguendo that benevolent concerns animated H.B. 2, Fisher II suggests that 
such benevolent intentions should not prevent courts from likening the 
facially neutral policy to overt discrimination.119  Although North Carolina 
recently repealed H.B. 2, at least sixteen states considered passing similar 
laws in 2017, and the constitutionality of such efforts is an ongoing 
concern.120 
To be sure, the facially neutral percentage plan was not the main focus in 
Fisher II; accordingly, Fisher II did not speak in detail about bridging the 
divide between facial discrimination and disparate impact.121  Nonetheless, 
we can see a trend line between Fisher II’s discussion of the percentage plan, 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence, and the majority opinion in 
Obergefell.122  These three opinions chip away at the wall that previously 
divided facial discrimination and disparate impact. 
According to this trajectory, at least some instances of disparate impact 
should trigger the same rigorous review that facial discrimination receives, 
even if invidious intent cannot be proven.123  Whether disparate impact 
receives rigorous review should be determined at least in part by the severity 
of the disparate impact and not solely by the intent of the state actor.  Based 
on the recent cases we have examined, however, it is unclear how severe a 
disparate impact must be to warrant rigorous review.  Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence in Lawrence suggests that courts should consider the 
quantitative aspect of impact.124  To reach her conclusion that the facially 
neutral sodomy law discriminated based on sexual orientation, she invoked 
statistics and noted that the law’s impact “closely correlated” with being 
gay.125  The majority in Obergefell looked beyond statistics and drew 
attention to the qualitative aspect of impact.126  It noted that marriage bans, 
which were facially neutral with respect to sexual orientation, harmed gay 
 
to regulate trans bathroom use,” see Stephen Rushin & Jenny Carroll, Bathroom Laws as 
Status Crimes, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8–12 (2017). 
 118. See Answer and Counterclaims of the State of North Carolina, Governor Patrick L. 
McCrory, and the North Carolina Department of Public Safety at 25, United States v. North 
Carolina, 1:16-CV-00425 (M.D.N.C. dismissed June 2, 2016). 
 119. Recall that, in Fisher II, the facially neutral percentage plan was motivated by 
benevolent race-consciousness, and the Court likened the percentage plan to the University’s 
holistic review program, which overtly considered race. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213. 
 120. See Joellen Kralik, “Bathroom Bill” Legislative Tracking, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (July 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-
legislative-tracking635951130.aspx [https://perma.cc/TEG7-WYYB]. 
 121. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213. 
 122. For a discussion of Lawrence and Obergefell, see supra notes 77–102 and 
accompanying text. 
 123. See supra notes 69–102 and accompanying text. 
 124. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–04 (2015). 
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people in both tangible and intangible ways.127  While these two opinions 
demonstrate that courts could examine disparate impact from both 
quantitative and qualitative perspectives, they do not clearly delineate a point 
at which disparate impact becomes significant enough to warrant rigorous 
judicial review. 
It is worth emphasizing again that the blurring of facial discrimination and 
disparate impact is very recent—the Court did not decide Obergefell until 
2015,128 and Fisher was decided in 2016.129  For decades prior, the Court and 
lower federal courts subjected disparate impact to minimal judicial review 
because invidious intent could not be proven in accordance with Feeney.130  
For example, courts have applied minimal review to facially neutral criminal 
laws that adversely affect persons of color and to facially neutral school 
districting policies that create de facto racial segregation.131  It is yet to be 
seen whether courts will note that the line between facial discrimination and 
disparate impact has become blurred and then further blur that line.132  In Part 
III, we argue in favor of continuing this trajectory of change. 
B.  Collapsing Standards of Review 
In addition to examining the distinction between facial discrimination and 
disparate impact, courts traditionally have also considered the characteristic 
on which a law discriminates to determine the standard of review in equal 
protection cases.133  It is conventional wisdom that different characteristics—
such as race, sex, and sexual orientation—trigger a different tier of review.  
We contend, however, that this tiered system has begun to collapse. 
Before discussing how tiers of equal protection review have collapsed, an 
examination of how the Court constructed tiers in the first place is in order.  
It is generally understood that the Court has explicitly articulated three 
standards of review in equal protection cases:  strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, and rational basis review.134  Each standard has its own means-ends 
test for evaluating whether the state has violated the Constitution.  To justify 
a discriminatory law under strict scrutiny, the state must prove that the law is 
“narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling government interest.”135  
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 2584.  
 129. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2198 (2016). 
 130. See Siegel, supra note 64, 22–23, 47–50 (discussing various litigation concerning de 
facto school segregation and racial impact in the criminal justice system). 
 131. See id. 
 132. Further, even if courts agree that laws can trigger rigorous review because of their 
disparate impact regardless of legislative intent, courts might fail to see the intangible ways in 
which some laws impact groups of people differently. Cf. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 
Undignified:  The Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and Dignity Claims, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1, 22–
24 (2017) (arguing that the Supreme Court has largely failed to recognize the dignity interests 
of marginalized social groups). 
 133. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 699–702. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[Suspect] 
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further 
compelling governmental interests.”). 
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According to intermediate scrutiny, the state must show that its 
discriminatory law is “substantially related” to an “important government 
interest.”136  Under rational basis review, a law violates equal protection if it 
is not “reasonably related” to any “legitimate government interest.”137 
Commentators refer to these standards as “tiers” because, for a long time, 
it was conventionally understood that each standard corresponded with a 
different level—or tier—of rigor with which the Court would review and 
strike down laws.138  Commentators have called strict scrutiny “fatal in fact” 
because, in the past, laws were extremely unlikely to pass such a rigorous 
test.139  In contrast, the Court was unlikely to strike down laws under rational 
basis review.140  Meanwhile, intermediate scrutiny has fallen somewhere in 
between, requiring the Court to engage in a balancing act.141 
In this Article, we pay particular attention to race, sex, and sexual 
orientation discrimination because they have been the primary subjects of the 
Court’s recent equal protection jurisprudence.142  The Court has 
acknowledged that race, sex, and sexual orientation have served as bases for 
unfair subordination throughout much of history.143  The Court has also said 
 
 136. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“[T]he [defender of the 
challenged action] must show ‘at least that the [challenged] classification serves important 
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related 
to the achievement of those objectives.’” (third alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) 
(stating that, for sex discrimination to be justified, it “must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”). 
 137. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (“[U]nless . . . it jeopardizes exercise 
of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the 
Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state 
interest.”).   
 138. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 483 
(2004); Stearns, supra note 21 (manuscript at 3–4); Yoshino, supra note 62, at 755–57. 
 139. E.g., Gunther, supra note 20, at 8; Yoshino, supra note 62, at 755 n.61. 
 140. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 138, at 489 (“[Under] rational basis review, the Court 
highlights its deferential approach to the law and policymaking branches.”); Yoshino, supra 
note 62, at 755–56 (“[R]ational basis review generally results in the validation of state 
action.”). 
 141. “‘Intermediate scrutiny,’ unlike the poles of the two-tier system, is an overtly 
balancing mode.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging:  The Roles of Categorization 
and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297 (1992). 
 142. The doctrinal trajectories that we discuss began to emerge over the past decade or two.  
During this time, the Court’s landmark equal protection cases focused on race, sex, and sexual-
orientation discrimination.  A notable exception is Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
Commentators believe that Bush v. Gore was framed so narrowly that it has virtually no 
precedential value. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal 
Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 386–87 (2001) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court limited its language in Bush v. Gore so explicitly and “extraordinar[ily]” to 
the facts of that case that it “appeared to dismiss any precedential value this case may have for 
future election law cases”); Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore:  Form and 
the Law of Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 65, 70–71 (2002) (commenting that Bush 
v. Gore has an explicit statement of its lack of precedential value). 
 143. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015) (emphasizing that gays 
and lesbians have suffered “a long history of disapproval of their relationships”); Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997) (acknowledging “widespread and persisting deprivation of 
constitutional rights resulting from this country’s history of racial discrimination”); Frontiero 
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that race, sex, and sexual orientation are all “immutable,” thus suggesting that 
these traits usually cannot be changed without imposing a great deal of 
hardship on individuals.144  Despite recognizing these similarities, the Court 
has designated different tiers of review to these statuses. 
The Court says it applies strict scrutiny to race discrimination and 
intermediate scrutiny to sex discrimination.145  This difference reflects the 
Court’s understanding that race discrimination is “so seldom relevant” to 
government goals,146 while “natural differences between the sexes are 
sometimes relevant and sometimes wholly irrelevant.”147  Meanwhile, the 
Court has applied rational basis review to sexual orientation discrimination 
but has also avoided explicitly identifying its standard of review in recent 
sexual orientation cases.148 
The tiered framework of review has sparked widespread criticism.149  A 
frequent critique is that, despite what the Court says it is doing, it has actually 
developed more than just three tiers of review and that the proliferation of 
tiers has become unwieldy.150  Commentators have argued that, as a de facto 
matter, the Court has been applying four, five, six, or even seven different 
 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging “a long and 
unfortunate history of sex discrimination”). 
 144. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (calling sexual orientation “a normal expression of 
human sexuality and immutable”); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (“[S]ex, like race and national 
origin, is an immutable characteristic.”).  Although the Supreme Court has not defined 
“immutability” clearly, some lower courts have said that calling a trait immutable does not 
necessarily mean that the trait is unchangeable; instead, immutability means that the trait is at 
least difficult for many people to change. See Clarke, supra note 22, at 34–35.  Other courts 
have expanded the definition of immutability by stating that a trait should be considered 
immutable whenever it would be unfair to ask someone to change that aspect of themselves. 
See id. at 25–26, 35–36. 
 145. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to women’s exclusion from a military academy); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to a race-conscious affirmative action 
program). 
 146. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 442 (1985) 
(discussing why discrimination based on mental disability is to be distinguished from 
discrimination based on race, national origin, and alienage). 
 147. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 497 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(describing the majority’s reason for subjecting sex discrimination to intermediate scrutiny in 
a case concerning gender bias in statutory rape laws). 
 148. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (stating that the Court would analyze 
whether the disputed state measure, which discriminated against gays and lesbians, “bears a 
rational relation to some legitimate end”); infra notes 173–87 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Court’s failure to identify its standard of review in recent sexual orientation 
cases); see also Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of 
Marriage, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 107, 113–14 (2015) (explaining that it is unclear what level 
of scrutiny the Court will apply to sexual-orientation discrimination in future cases). 
 149. For critiques of the tiered framework of review, see generally Sarah Erickson-
Muschko, What Is the Purpose?  Affirmative Action, DOMA, and the Untenable Tiered 
Framework for Equal Protection Review, 101 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 44 (2013); Fleming, supra 
note 21; Goldberg, supra note 138; Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure:  The Coming 
Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (1984); Stearns, supra note 21; 
Note, Justice Stevens’ Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1987). 
 150. E.g., Fleming, supra note 21, at 2304; Smith, supra note 20, at 2774; Stearns, supra 
note 21 (manuscript at 4). 
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tiers.151  Many commentators believe that a fourth tier of scrutiny is apparent 
in sexual-orientation discrimination cases.152  Consider, for example, United 
States v. Windsor.153  There, the Court did not explicitly identify the tier of 
review that it used to strike down part of the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) for discrimination based on sexual orientation.154  Under 
conventional wisdom, rational basis review is the default if the Court does 
not state that is applying intermediate or strict scrutiny.155  In Windsor, 
however, the Court’s actions did not comport with traditional understandings 
of rational basis review.  It held that section 3 of DOMA violated equal 
protection because it stemmed from animus, despite the government’s 
contentions to the contrary.156  The government claimed that DOMA grew 
out of a desire for administrative ease and that creating a uniform definition 
of marriage advanced that interest.157  In rejecting this argument, the Court 
implied that the claim was pretext and did not defer to the government as 
rational basis review would traditionally require.158  Thus, commentators 
have labeled this search for animus a new tier of review—sometimes called 
“rational basis with bite”159 or “a more searching form of rational basis 
review.”160 
While rational basis review “with bite” destabilizes the Court’s official 
three-tier framework, the framework is also destabilized by the weakening of 
strict scrutiny.  In Fisher II, the Court purported to apply strict scrutiny, but 
many commentators contend that the Court applied a less rigorous standard 
instead.161  In analyzing the University of Texas’s holistic admissions 
 
 151. See Fleming, supra note 21, at 2304 (listing six tiers); R. Randall Kelso, Standards of 
Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting 
Individual Rights:  The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 225, 226 (2002) (listing seven tiers); Smith, supra note 20, at 2774 (listing four 
tiers); Stearns, supra note 21 (manuscript at 4) (listing five tiers). 
 152. E.g., Fleming, supra note 21, at 2308; Smith, supra note 20, at 2774; Stearns, supra 
note 21 (manuscript at 43–45). 
 153. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 154. This may be a sign that the Court has grown ambivalent about its tiers of review. See 
Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 527, 530 n.7 (2014) (listing examples of commentators who interpret the 
Court’s gay rights cases to indicate a shift away from tiered review). 
 155. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 698–702. 
 156. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
 157. Id. at 2690. 
 158. See id. at 2694; see also Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products:  Equal Protection from 
Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 247 (explaining that when the Court has found indicia of 
animus behind a law, such as DOMA, it does not defer to the government’s assertion of 
interests as it would under traditional rational basis review). 
 159. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 20, at 2774. 
 160. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  For an 
argument that rational basis review has long fluctuated in intensity despite the conventional 
depiction of rational basis review as being uniformly weak, see Katie Eyer, The Canon of 
Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 161. Commentators from both sides of the ideological spectrum have alleged that the Court 
applied a less rigorous standard than usual strict scrutiny. See, e.g., The Editors, In Fisher, 
Another Blow to Equal Opportunity, NAT’L REV. (June 23, 2016, 6:22 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/437047/fisher-v-ut-supreme-court-gets-it-wrong 
[https://perma.cc/K34H-7QTX]; Richard Lempert, In Fisher, Affirmative Action Survives 
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program, the Court deferred substantially to the University’s belief that it had 
a compelling interest in securing a diverse student body and that race-based 
affirmative action was necessary to achieve that goal.162  By taking such a 
relaxed approach to strict scrutiny, the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis begins 
to look less rigorous.163 
The three-tier framework of equal protection has outlived its helpfulness.  
The Court struggles with situating cases into the rigid tiers.164  Perhaps this 
is why, in recent sexual-orientation cases, the Court has chosen not to speak 
of the tiered framework at all.165  Likewise, in its most recent sex 
discrimination case, Sessions v. Morales-Santana,166 the Court did not once 
utter the phrase “intermediate scrutiny.”167  The gradual collapse of the tiered 
 
Again, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (June 24, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/ 
2016/06/24/in-fisher-affirmative-action-survives-again [https://perma.cc/A6DD-TWES]; 
George A. Nation III, Something Strange Indeed, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2016/06/27/problems-justice-anthony-kennedys-
opinion-fisher-ii-case-essay [https://perma.cc/S6BX-YB2A]; Mark Joseph Stern, Supreme 
Court Affirms Constitutionality of Texas Affirmative Action Program, SLATE (June 23, 2016, 
10:49 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/06/23/fisher_v_texas_supreme_ 
court_affirms_constitutionality_of_affirmative_action.html [https://perma.cc/3XCY-FCBH]. 
 162. See  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (stating 
that the Court would grant some deference to the University’s definition of the educational 
goals served by affirmative action and that the University need not exhaust all race-neutral 
alternatives to race-based affirmative action).  Prior to Fisher II, the Court wavered on how 
rigorously it should review race-based affirmative action programs.  At one point, the Court 
applied only intermediate scrutiny to such programs. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 
547, 564 (1990).  The Court eventually replaced intermediate scrutiny with strict scrutiny. See 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  Still, the Court fluctuated 
regarding how to define strict scrutiny.  In the affirmative action case of Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Court was quite deferential to the University of Michigan, defined 
“narrow tailoring” loosely, and stated that narrow tailoring “does not require exhaustion of 
every conceivable race-neutral alternative.” Id. at 339.  In Fisher v. University of Texas at 
Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), the Court cast some doubt on whether it would 
preserve Grutter’s deferential approach, id. at 2418–19, but Fisher II eventually confirmed 
this deferential approach, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208.  For a more detailed discussion of this 
line of cases, see generally Stearns, supra note 21. 
 163. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.  For arguments that strict scrutiny has 
been less rigorous than conventionally understood, even prior to Fisher II, see generally Ozan 
O. Varol, Strict in Theory, but Accommodating in Fact?, 75 MO. L. REV. 1243 (2010); Adam 
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact:  An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). 
 164. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
 165. Numerous commentators have interpreted the Court’s gay rights cases as a shift away 
from tiered review. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 154, at 530 n.7 (listing sources that adopt this 
interpretation of the Court’s gay rights jurisprudence).  In this Article, we build on this 
literature by showing that the Court is not only moving away from tiered review but is 
gradually replacing tiered review with a unitary balancing test that, in some respects, 
resembles the proportionality analyses that foreign jurisdictions commonly perform in equality 
cases. 
 166. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). 
 167. See id.  Instead, Morales-Santana used the phrase “heightened scrutiny,” which 
commentators have employed as an umbrella term to describe any scrutiny that is more 
rigorous than rational basis review. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 138, at 483 n.11 (referring 
to heightened scrutiny as “all levels of review above rational basis”); Christopher R. Leslie, 
Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. 
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framework has left lower courts with unclear doctrine that is difficult to 
follow.  As Nan Hunter has suggested, the Court is in an “interregnum”—an 
interval between doctrinal reigns.168  The reign of tiered review seems near 
its end, but the Court has yet to name its successor. 
Even so, a new doctrinal approach is beginning to emerge.  Instead of 
seeing recent cases as a proliferation of tiers, as some commentators do,169 
we believe the existing tiers are collapsing into a unitary balancing test.170  
To be clear, the pattern that we see thus far emerges from the Court’s recent 
cases, which pertain to discrimination based on personal characteristics that 
are difficult to change—namely race, sex, and sexual orientation.171  Thus, 
we are unable to say whether the emergence of a unitary standard will also 
apply to discrimination based on characteristics that are either not personal 
or not difficult to change, such as the differential treatment of licensed 
optometrists and ophthalmologists versus unlicensed opticians at issue in the 
old case of Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.172 
In recent U.S. equal protection cases, the Court seems to consider the same 
four key factors, regardless of whether it is reviewing a law concerning race, 
sex, or sexual orientation.  These factors are (1) the role of prejudice, in the 
form of animus or stereotyping behind the law, (2) the seriousness of harm 
caused by the law, (3) governmental goals behind the law, and (4) the extent 
to which the law is related to achieving those government interests. 
The last two factors reflect the means-ends analysis that is conventional in 
equal protection analyses.  As a de jure matter, the Court says it calibrates the 
means-ends analysis based on the ground of discrimination at issue (race, 
sexual orientation, or sex) because it assigns a tier of scrutiny according to 
the discriminatory ground.  As a de facto matter, however, the Court’s means-
ends analysis is not calibrated as such.  Instead, the Court adjusts its means-
ends analysis based on the first two factors. 
 
REV. 1077, 1084 (2014) (“Both strict and intermediate scrutiny are forms of heightened 
scrutiny.”). 
 168. See Nan D. Hunter, Twenty-First Century Equal Protection:  Making Law in an 
Interregnum, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 141, 141 (2006). 
 169. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Calvin Massey, The New Formalism:  Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 945, 946 (2004) (“[T]he neat compartments of tiered scrutiny are beginning to 
collapse.”); Peter S. Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review:  Has the United States Supreme 
Court Adopted a “Sliding Scale” Approach Toward Equal Protection Jurisprudence?, 23 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 475, 476 (1997) (“[T]he Rehnquist Court is moving away from this [tiered] 
framework toward a more flexible approach.”). 
 171. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of Supreme Court 
equal protection cases over the past two decades).  While the Supreme Court has decided 
recent cases concerning statutory prohibitions of discrimination based on personal 
characteristics beyond race, sex, and sexual orientation, the Court has not addressed such 
discrimination from the equal protection angle in recent years. See Michael E. Waterstone, 
Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527, 529 (2014) (noting that Court has not 
decided a disability discrimination case based on equal protection since 1985). 
 172. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).  The court in Lee Optical Co. applied rational basis review to a 
law that discriminated between licensed optometrists and ophthalmologists on the one hand, 
and unlicensed opticians on the other. Id. at 483. 
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Consider the example of sexual orientation.  In recent cases, the Court has 
refused to assign any of the three traditional tiers of means-ends analysis to 
sexual-orientation discrimination.173  Instead, in cases of sexual-orientation 
discrimination, the Court’s means-ends analysis has been part of a larger 
analysis that considers all four of the factors identified above.  In Windsor, 
the Court noted that it struck down section 3 of DOMA because “no 
legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect [of DOMA] to 
disparage and to injure” same-sex couples.174  This statement reflects the 
Court’s consideration of animus (i.e., the purpose to disparage and injure) as 
well as DOMA’s harmful effects.  After Windsor found that DOMA was 
motivated by animus and had injurious effects,175 the Court seemed to ratchet 
up its means-ends analysis, although it did not acknowledge this explicitly.  
The government claimed that DOMA advanced a legitimate government 
interest in administrative clarity because maintaining a uniform definition of 
marriage allowed the federal government to avoid difficult choice-of-law 
problems.176  The Court in Windsor, however, did not defer to the 
government’s assertion.  Instead, it conducted a more rigorous means-ends 
analysis than rational basis would usually require and ultimately rejected the 
state’s purported interest in promoting uniformity.177  Windsor thus 
calibrated its means-ends analysis in light of the animus behind the law and 
the law’s harmful effects; more rigorous evidence of DOMA advancing a 
legitimate government goal was needed to counterbalance the Court’s 
concerns about animus and DOMA’s injurious effects. 
The Court’s other landmark same-sex marriage case, Obergefell, also 
reflects a judicial consideration of the four factors we identified.  First, 
Obergefell acknowledged that same-sex marriage bans are not necessarily 
motivated by animus or stereotypes.178  Next, however, Obergefell 
emphasized the grave injury of denying same-sex couples the fundamental 
right to marry.179  Interestingly, Obergefell did not reason mechanistically 
that infringing on a fundamental right triggers “strict scrutiny,” which the 
Court had done in earlier cases.180  The Court never once says it is applying 
 
 173. See generally Hunter, supra note 148 (tracing the trajectory of the Court’s gay rights 
cases). 
 174. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
 175. See id. at 2693 (“This is strong evidence of [DOMA] having the purpose and effect of 
disapproval of a class recognized and protected by state law.”). 
 176. The dissenting opinions by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia both accepted this 
contention about uniformity and stability. See id. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 2708 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 177. For thoughtful elaboration on this point, see Carpenter, supra note 158, at 247. 
 178. For our earlier discussion about Obergefell’s acknowledgement that same-sex 
marriage bans do not necessarily stem from animus, see supra notes 86–89 and accompanying 
text.  
 179. For our earlier discussion about Obergefell’s elaboration on the harms of same-sex 
marriage bans, see supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text. 
 180. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383, 388 (1978) (discussing the marriage 
rights of noncustodial parents who owe child support). 
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“strict scrutiny” in its opinion.181  Instead, the Court engaged in a more fluid 
analysis of whether the infringement could be justified.182 
The Court discussed two purported government goals behind banning 
same-sex marriage.  The state-defendants first argued that the government 
had an interest in “proceed[ing] with caution” by taking more time to 
implement social change.183  In rejecting this argument, the Court did not 
speak in terms of “strict scrutiny,” “compelling interest,” or “narrow 
tailoring.”184  Instead, the Court reasoned that the government’s interest in 
using marriage bans to promote incrementalism did not outweigh the 
“injuries” and dignitary wounds inflicted by marriage bans.185  The Court 
also rejected the government’s claim that same-sex marriage bans help to 
prevent declining rates of marriage among different-sex couples.186  There 
was simply no evidence to show that legalizing same-sex marriage would 
have an effect on different-sex couples’ decision-making about marriage.187  
In sum, Obergefell struck down marriage bans after the weighing of four 
factors—the lack of animus, the bans’ harmful effects, the governments’ 
goals, and the insufficient connection of marriage bans to those goals. 
The collapsing of tiered review is also evident in Fisher II.  As we 
discussed earlier, Fisher II paid lip service to strict scrutiny when it seemed 
to engage in a more lenient standard of review instead.188  The Court was 
opaque as to why it deviated from traditional strict scrutiny.  To understand 
this deviation, it is helpful to remember that, for a brief period, the Court had 
explicitly applied a lesser standard of review—intermediate scrutiny—to 
race-based affirmative action programs.189  During this time, Justice William 
Brennan reasoned that affirmative action programs only trigger intermediate 
scrutiny because the programs’ use of racial classifications were 
benevolent.190  One way to understand Fisher II is to view it as a de facto 
retreat back toward Justice Brennan’s reasoning. 
In Fisher II, the Court accepted that the University’s use of racial 
categories was benevolent.191  The program was intended to ameliorate, 
rather than perpetuate, racial animus and stereotyping.192  Indeed, the Court 
accepted that the program’s purposes and effects included “the destruction of 
 
 181. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584–611 (2015). 
 182. See id. at 2605–07. 
 183. Id. at 2605. 
 184. See generally id. 
 185. See id. at 2606. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. at 2607. 
 188. See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990) (holding that the FCC’s 
“minority preference policies” passed intermediate scrutiny). 
 190. In a dissent, Justice Brennan argued for intermediate scrutiny. Regents of Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  He later joined a plurality 
opinion applying intermediate scrutiny, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517 (1980), 
and applied intermediate scrutiny in a majority opinion, see Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 600–
01. 
 191. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210–11 (2016). 
 192. Id. at 2211.  
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stereotypes, the promot[ion of] cross-racial understanding, [and] the 
preparation of a student body for an increasingly diverse workforce and 
society.”193  Moreover, the Court suggested that these beneficial 
consequences of having a diverse student body outweighed the harms alleged 
by the dissenting Justices.194  Reading Fisher II through the lens of Justice 
Brennan’s earlier decisions leads one to believe that the benevolent purposes 
and salutary effects of the University’s admissions program led the Court to 
relax its so-called strict scrutiny of the program.195  In this view, Fisher II 
comports with the multifactor analysis that we have identified.196 
Fisher II contrasts with Cooper v. Harris,197 which the Court decided a 
year later.198  Both cases concerned race, but the Court calibrated strict 
scrutiny differently.  The Court did not explicitly acknowledge or explain this 
difference, but one way to understand the difference is to view the 
calibrations as linked to considerations of intent and harm, in accordance with 
the multifactor analysis identified above.199  Harris invalidated two 
legislative districting maps that North Carolina redrew based predominately 
on race.200  The Court exercised a less deferential form of review than it did 
in Fisher II, perhaps because of the harms posed by the districting maps.201  
The maps harmed African American voters by packing them into two 
districts and diminishing their political power in neighboring districts.202  
North Carolina had claimed that it needed to pack African Americans into 
the two districts to empower African American voters within those districts 
in compliance with the Voting Rights Act.203  Instead of deferring to North 
Carolina, the Court held that North Carolina lacked any “good reason” to 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Three dissenting Justices claimed that the University’s admissions program harmed 
Asian American applicants and other applicants who did not receive a “boost” based on race. 
See id. at 2227 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 195. For Justice Brennan’s opinions applying intermediate scrutiny to benign racial 
classifications, see supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 196. Recall that we believe that the Court is modulating its means-ends analysis based not 
on the ground of discrimination (e.g., race, sex, and sexual orientation) but based instead on 
consideration of prejudice in the form of animus or stereotypes and the seriousness of injury 
created by the discrimination. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text. 
 197. 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017). 
 198. See id. at 1481–82 (finding legislative maps for North Carolina Districts 1 and 12 to 
be unconstitutional). 
 199. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text. 
 200. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1468 (affirming the trial court’s finding that North Carolina drew 
both legislative districts based predominately on race.). 
 201. Id. at 1481–82. 
 202. See Adam Liptak, Justices Reject 2 Districts in North Carolina, Citing Packing of 
Black Voters, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/us/politics/ 
supreme-court-north-carolina-congressional-districts.html [https://perma.cc/YA8Z-DXMC] 
(relating Harris to earlier cases in which the Court acknowledged that packing African 
American voters into a small number of districts dilutes their voting power). 
 203. North Carolina asserted this justification with respect to District 1. See Harris, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1468.  With respect to District 12, North Carolina argued that its map was not racially 
motivated instead of arguing that the consideration of race was justified. See id. at 1473. 
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believe its claim to be true because African Americans already wielded 
sufficient power within the two districts to elect their preferred candidates.204 
Finally, the Court’s three most recent sex discrimination cases also seem 
to fit the multifactor analysis that we have identified.  In United States v. 
Virginia,205 the Court applied a version of intermediate scrutiny that seemed 
rather strict and ultimately struck down the exclusion of women from the 
Virginia Military Institute.206  The Court noted that the means-ends analysis 
must be “exceedingly persuasive.”207  By contrast, in Nguyen v. INS,208 the 
Court applied intermediate scrutiny in a much less exacting manner, which 
led commentators to allege that the Court had abandoned the spirit of 
requiring “exceedingly persuasive justifications” for differential treatment 
based on sex.209  Nguyen ultimately upheld immigration rules that treated 
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers differently.210  More recently, the 
Court again applied a rigorous form of heightened scrutiny in Morales-
Santana and struck down a different immigration rule that also discriminated 
between unwed mothers and fathers.211 
The tension in these sex discrimination cases can be reconciled by focusing 
on the Court’s concerns about gender stereotypes.  On one hand, the Court 
believed that the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute was 
based on harmful gender stereotypes.212  Likewise, in Morales-Santana, the 
Court found that the immigration rule at issue, which imposed a longer 
residency requirement on unwed fathers seeking to confer citizenship on their 
children, reflected gender stereotypes about parenting.213  On the other hand, 
the majority in Nguyen found that the challenged immigration rule 
distinguished between men and women because of “real” biological 
differences as opposed to stereotypes.214 
It seems that the Court relaxed its means-ends analysis in Nguyen because 
it believed that the immigration policy was motivated by neither stereotype 
nor animus.215  By juxtaposing these three sex discrimination cases, we see 
more signs that the Court is concerned with the four factors we identified.  In 
 
 204. Id. at 1482. 
 205. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 206. See id. at 558.  
 207. Id. at 531. 
 208. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 209. See Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices:  Legal Feminism and the Historical 
Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 830–32 (2004); Stearns, supra note 21 
(manuscript at 19); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CALIF. L. 
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 210. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 72–73. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 549–50. 
 213. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1684–85 (2017). 
 214. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 54. 
 215. For elaboration on this observation, see Mayeri, supra note 209, at 803–32; Stearns, 
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see Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 469–
72 (2007). 
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these cases, the Court seems to be calibrating its means-ends analysis based 
on the relevance of stereotyping, and stereotyping’s attendant harms, to the 
case at hand.216  The Court is not calibrating its means-ends analysis based 
on the existence of a sex-based classification per se, but it is instead 
calibrating the analysis based on whether there are indicia of stereotyping 
behind the sex-based categories. 
In sum, if we look at the Court’s recent equal protection cases—which 
have addressed discrimination based on sexual orientation, race, and sex—
we see that the tiered system of review has begun to fray.  In sexual-
orientation cases, the Court has chosen not to assign sexual orientation to any 
specific tier of scrutiny.217  Meanwhile, in the race and sex discrimination 
cases, the Court seems to be using the tiered structure in name only.218  The 
case law seems muddled and confusing.  We can make sense of these cases, 
however, if we understand them as the beginning of a jurisprudential 
trajectory away from tiered analysis toward a unitary standard of review.  
Under this standard, the Court calibrates its mean-ends analysis not based on 
the grounds of discrimination at issue but on considerations of animus and 
stereotyping as motivations for the challenged law and on the harm the law 
inflicts on people’s lived experiences. 
If the Court continues along this jurisprudential trajectory, it should be 
more explicit about jettisoning tiered review of discrimination based on 
personal characteristics.  The Court should also speak more clearly about how 
the four factors that we have identified interrelate in the Court’s evaluation 
of equal protection.  Further, the Court should clarify whether the emerging 
standard applies to personal characteristics beyond race, sex, and sexual 
orientation.  We believe it should apply at least to additional characteristics 
that are difficult to change and have a history of being the bases of 
prejudice—features that the Court has emphasized when talking about race, 
sex, and sexual orientation.219  It is less clear, however, whether the same 
 
 216. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68; Virginia, 518 U.S. at 549–50. 
 217. See supra notes 173–87 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra notes 188–216 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.  For example, we believe that the 
emerging standard should apply to disability because disability status has long been a basis of 
prejudice and an individual’s disabilities are difficult to change. Cf. Waterstone, supra note 
171, at 572–73 (arguing that the logic of recent equal protection cases concerning sexual 
orientation should be extended to cases concerning disability discrimination).  Although 
commentators sometimes contend that a group’s political power (or lack thereof) should be a 
factor in determining what tier of scrutiny that group receives, we do not believe that political 
power should guide whether to apply the Court’s emerging unitary standard.  It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to engage in a full discussion on the relationship between political 
powerlessness and equal protection; it is worth noting, however, that we agree with 
commentators who have concluded that political powerlessness is already no longer a required 
factor in equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (arguing that political powerlessness is not a necessary factor for determining the 
tier of review in equal protection cases); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness 
a Requirement for Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 7–10 (2010) 
(contending that political powerlessness is not necessary to equal protection analysis). 
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unitary standard of review would apply to discrimination based on 
characteristics that are not personal or not difficult to change.220 
To be sure, some Justices have argued explicitly for a unitary approach to 
equal protection.  Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens argued 
for unitary standards in concurring and dissenting opinions years ago.221  
Neither Justice, however, had the opportunity to thoroughly explain what a 
unitary standard should look like.  In the following Parts, we demonstrate that 
foreign jurisdictions have developed a great deal of case law that applies 
unitary tests to equal protection cases.  This body of jurisprudence can help 
the Supreme Court to clarify the direction of its own doctrinal development. 
II.  GROWING GLOBAL CONVERGENCE 
In blurring the distinction between facial discrimination and disparate 
impact and in collapsing tiered review of equal protection cases, the Supreme 
Court has brought the United States closer in line with major foreign 
jurisdictions.  In other words, the two jurisprudential trajectories that we 
identified in the previous Part combine to form a third trajectory:  global 
convergence. 
In Part III of this Article, we turn to the prescriptive significance of the 
United States’ emerging convergence with foreign jurisdictions.  We argue 
that, in the future, the Supreme Court should engage foreign equality 
jurisprudence more openly and directly.222  Foreign law certainly is not 
binding on the United States, but the Supreme Court can improve its own 
reasoning by drawing on information from abroad.223  Before we turn to that 
prescriptive claim, however, we lay the groundwork by illustrating the ways 
in which the United States is already converging with foreign peers.  Part II.A 
sheds light on convergence with respect to the bridging of facial 
discrimination and disparate impact.  Part II.B illuminates convergence with 
respect to replacing tiered review with a unitary standard of review. 
In this Article, we do not purport to survey all the jurisdictions of the 
world.  Instead, we focus on three jurisdictions that are commonly viewed as 
jurisprudential leaders in the global arena:  Canada, South Africa, and the 
Council of Europe.224  These jurisdictions have developed reputations for 
 
 220. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.  
 221. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (critiquing 
the tiered approach to equal protection because “[t]here is only one Equal Protection Clause”); 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (expressing dissatisfaction with tiered review because “this Court’s decisions in 
the field of equal protection defy such easy categorization”). 
 222. See infra Part III. 
 223. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 353 (discussing the value of foreign law as persuasive 
authority). 
 224. The Council of Europe is a regional organization that focuses on human rights issues.  
The Council of Europe predates, and should not be confused with, the European Union.  The 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is binding on members of the Council of 
Europe.  See ECHR—Introduction, ECHR-ONLINE.INFO, http://echr-online.info/echr-
introduction [https://perma.cc/4C8B-8FH7] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). The Council of 
Europe’s most well-known institution is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which 
interprets the ECHR and serves as a court of last resort for human rights claims in Europe.  
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respecting the rule of law and producing court opinions that are frequently 
cited across borders because of their persuasive reasoning.225  These 
jurisdictions have also become frequent case studies in comparative 
constitutional law scholarship.226  Our analysis below of Canada, South 
Africa, and the Council of Europe shows how the United States’ equal 
protection doctrine is converging with equality jurisprudence of these leaders 
in the global arena. 
To provide additional texture to our analysis, we also discuss 
developments in Hong Kong.  Although Hong Kong is not one of the “usual 
suspects” in comparative analysis,227 its recent case law has addressed the 
distinction between facial discrimination and disparate impact and has 
refined Hong Kong’s standard of review for equal protection.228  Hong Kong 
is also a jurisdiction familiar to many American lawyers because of its 
reputable legal system and the role of English as a lingua franca in Hong 
 
For more background on the Council of Europe, see COUNCIL EUR., http://www.coe.int 
[https://perma.cc/69YY-JRQ9] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).  
 225. Among national apex courts, “[t]he South African and Canadian constitutional courts 
have both been highly influential, apparently more so than the U.S. Supreme Court and other 
older and more established constitutional courts.” Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Brave New 
Judicial World, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 277, 289 (Michael 
Ignatieff ed., 2005).  According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, one reason these courts have 
become so influential is that they have been effective at drawing lessons from across the globe; 
these courts “capture and crystallize the work of their fellow constitutional judges around the 
world.” Id.; see also Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation, 
in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253, 258 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donahue 
eds., 2000) (“[I]deas and constitutionalists of Canada have been disproportionately 
influential.”); Adam Liptak, U.S. Court Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html [https://perma.cc/7ZHT-BQVP] 
(“Many legal scholars singled out the Canadian Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa as increasingly influential.”).  The Council of Europe’s adjudicatory body, 
ECtHR, is frequently cited as persuasive authority around the world.  John B. Attanasio, 
Rapporteur’s Overview and Conclusions:  Of Sovereignty, Globalization, and Courts, 28 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 16 (1995) (noting that the ECtHR “may be becoming a sort of 
world court of human rights”); see also Liptak, supra (“These days, foreign courts in 
developed democracies often cite the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in cases 
concerning equality, liberty and prohibitions against cruel treatment, said Harold Hongju Koh, 
the Dean of the Yale Law School.”).  
 226. For some recent examples of scholarship using these jurisdictions as case studies, see 
generally Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance:  Judicial Strategy in Comparative 
Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1 (2016); Robert Leckey, The Harms of Remedial Discretion, 14 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 584 (2016). 
 227. Some commentators believe it is important to look beyond the usual suspects in 
selecting case studies in comparative law scholarship. See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE 
MATTERS:  THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 205–23 (2014). 
 228. The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal recently discussed the standard of review for 
constitutional equality claims in two cases concerning discrimination based on residency 
status. See Kong Yunming v. Dir. of Soc. Welfare, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 950 (C.F.A.); Fok 
Chun Wa v. Hosp. Auth., [2012] 15 H.K.C.F.A.R. 409 (C.F.A.).  Courts in Hong Kong have 
also elaborated on the constitutional protection of equality through a series of gay rights cases. 
See Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo, [2007] 10 H.K.C.F.A.R. 335 (C.F.A.); Leung T 
C William Roy v. Sec’y for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.A.); QT v. Dir. of 
Immigration, [2016] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 583 (C.F.I.); Leung Chun Kwong v. Sec’y for the Civil 
Serv., [2017] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 1132 (C.F.I.). 
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Kong’s judiciary.229  Thus, we supplement our analysis of Canada, South 
Africa, and the Council of Europe by examining developments in Hong 
Kong.  This sample of foreign jurisdictions cuts across four continents and 
diverse cultural contexts.230 
A.  The Bridge Between Facial Discrimination 
and Disparate Impact 
The foreign jurisdictions we studied have all eliminated the gap between 
facial discrimination and disparate impact in constitutional law,231 although 
they sometimes do so under different terminology.  Facial discrimination, for 
example, is sometimes referred to as “direct discrimination,” and disparate 
impact is sometimes referred to as “indirect discrimination” or “adverse 
impact” discrimination.232  The differences in terminology notwithstanding, 
all of these jurisdictions have similarly bridged the gap between the two 
categories of cases. 
Canada led the way in bridging the gap.  The text of Canada’s 
constitutional provision concerning equality is worded vaguely.233  As such, 
it could be interpreted to cover only cases of facial discrimination,234 but the 
 
 229. Cf. Tanna Chong, Foreign Firms May Flee If Reforms Go Wrong Way:  Top US 
Lawyer, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/article/1347760/foreign-firms-may-flee-hong-kong-if-reforms-go-wrong-way-top-us 
[https://perma.cc/8J5Q-JETV] (noting that many international law firms choose to work in 
Hong Kong because of Hong Kong’s “regulatory schemes and strong, independent courts” but 
noting that this preference might change depending on Hong Kong’s growing tension with 
mainland China). 
 230. Some commentators believe cross-cultural convergence on a particular human rights 
approach makes that approach especially strong because the convergence suggests that the 
approach transcends specific cultural biases. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, International Consensus 
as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 63, 103–04 (2007) 
(summarizing literature on cross-cultural convergence as an indication of reasoning free of 
cultural bias); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
131, 153 (2006) (“As long as the societies allow free debate, the very fact that very different 
societies come to the same conclusions increases one’s confidence that the norms are 
genuinely universal and transcend merely historical or institutional differences.”). 
 231. There are examples of cases from these jurisdictions that approach disparate impact 
similarly to overt discrimination. See Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 
(Can.); D.H. v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007), http://hudoc.echr. 
coe.int/eng?i=001-83256 [https://perma.cc/7MBS-JAM2]; Leung T C William Roy v. Sec’y 
for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.A.); City Council v. Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) 
(S. Afr.).  These cases will be discussed in greater detail below. 
 232. See Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, Adverse Impact:  The Supreme 
Court’s Approach to Adverse Effects Discrimination Under Section 15 of the Charter, 19 REV. 
CONST. STUD. 191, 194–98 (2015) (providing a primer on terminology). 
 233. In Canada, the constitutional right to equality is enshrined in section 15(1) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states:  “Every individual is equal before 
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms § 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 234. Cf. SANDRA FREDMAN, EUR. COMM’N, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY LAWS OF THE US, CANADA, SOUTH AFRICA AND INDIA 49–51 
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Supreme Court of Canada rejected that approach.235  The court first 
expounded on adverse impact discrimination in 1989 in Andrews v. Law 
Society of British Columbia.236  Although the case concerned overt 
discrimination against bar applicants based on nationality, the court took this 
case as an opportunity to speak about equality more generally.237  It stated:  
“The ‘similarly situated should be similarly treated’ approach will not 
necessarily result in equality nor will every distinction or differentiation in 
treatment necessarily result in inequality.”238  It further noted that 
“[d]iscrimination is a distinction which, whether intentional or not[,] . . . has 
an effect which imposes disadvantages not imposed upon others or which 
withholds or limits access to advantages available to other members of 
society.”239 
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada relied on Andrews to 
strike down facially neutral laws because of their discriminatory effects.240  
For example, in Eldridge v. British Columbia,241 the court acknowledged that 
government health-care providers were, as a formal matter, not treating 
anyone differently by refusing to provide sign-language interpreters.242  The 
court concluded, however, that the policy’s adverse impact on deaf persons 
was unconstitutional discrimination regardless of whether the policy 
involved invidious intent.243  The Canadian court’s decision not to 
distinguish between facial discrimination and disparate impact was a 
philosophical decision not dictated by Canada’s constitutional text, which 
refers to equality only in vague terms.244  The Supreme Court of Canada 
reasoned from a philosophical perspective that, in order for constitutional 
protection of equality to be meaningful, it must focus on “substantive” 
equality by examining laws’ effects on people’s lived experiences.245  
Accordingly, the court must scrutinize laws that disadvantage people based 
on protected grounds,246 regardless of whether discrimination is intentional, 
 
(2012) (explaining that most constitutions, including Canada’s, do not elaborate on the 
meaning of equality and discrimination). 
 235. See Andrews, 1 S.C.R. at 145. 
 236. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.). 
 237. See id. at 145. 
 238. Id. at 168. 
 239. Id. at 174 (emphasis added). 
 240. See generally Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Can.) (holding that an 
antidiscrimination statute that omitted sexual orientation as a protected category was 
unconstitutional because of its discriminatory effects); Eldridge v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 
S.C.R. 624 (Can.) (concluding that a government health care program created an 
unconstitutional adverse impact based on disability).  
 241. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (Can.).  
 242. Id. at 626. 
 243. Id. at 629. 
 244. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text. 
 245. Eldridge, 3 S.C.R. at 627–29. 
 246. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms lists the following protected grounds:  
“race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).  Through case law, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has extended protection to “analogous” grounds. See Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 493, 495 (Can.) (treating sexual orientation as a protected ground). 
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because indirect discrimination inflicts injuries that are comparable to the 
injuries of intentional discrimination.247 
Inspired by the Canadian experience, South Africa has also bridged the gap 
between overt discrimination and discriminatory impact.248  The South 
African constitution’s Equality Clause explicitly provides that state and 
private actors “may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly.”249  After 
South Africa’s Apartheid, equality was a core concern shared by the drafters 
of both South Africa’s current constitution as well as the interim constitution 
put into place immediately after Apartheid.250  Their constitution’s explicit 
reference to indirect discrimination was intended to ensure comprehensive 
protections against discrimination.251 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa elaborated on the prohibition of 
indirect discrimination in the seminal case of City Council v. Walker.252  
There, the plaintiff challenged the city of Pretoria’s public-utility policies, 
which varied by neighborhood.253  The Court held that the city violated the 
constitutional protection of equality by selectively taking legal action against 
nonpaying residents of a predominantly white neighborhood.254  Although 
this enforcement policy was based on geography, and therefore was 
technically race neutral, it indirectly discriminated based on race.255  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Pius Langa stated that the constitution “recognises 
that conduct which may appear to be neutral and non-discriminatory may 
nonetheless result in discrimination”256 and that “[t]o ignore the racial impact 
of the [geographic] differentiation is to place form above substance.”257  
Furthermore, he concluded that proof of discriminatory intent was not 
required for the court to find the indirect discrimination unconstitutional.258 
Like the Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has also recognized 
that a facially neutral law can be deemed impermissible regardless of whether 
 
 247. See Hamilton & Koshan, supra note 232, at 196–97 (summarizing Supreme Court of 
Canada case law that discusses the similarities between direct and indirect discrimination). 
 248. See Arthur Chaskalson, Brown v. Board of Education:  Fifty Years Later, 36 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 503, 510–11 (2005) (noting that South Africa’s approach to adverse impact 
cases has been inspired by the experiences of Canada and the European Court of Justice). 
 249. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, § 9 (emphasis added). The interim constitution also 
explicitly barred unfair discrimination, direct or indirect. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993 
ch. 3, § 8. 
 250. See RICHARD SPITZ & MATTHEW CHASKALSON, THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION:  A 
HIDDEN HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 301 (2000); Catherine 
Albertyn & Janet Kentridge, Introducing the Right to Equality in the Interim Constitution, 10 
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 149, 149 (1994). 
 251. See SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 250, at 303; Albertyn & Kentridge, supra note 
250, at 166–67. 
 252. City Council v. Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 253. Id. paras. 5–6. 
 254. Id. para. 91. 
 255. Id. para. 32. 
 256. Id. para. 31. 
 257. Id. para. 33. 
 258. Id. para. 43. 
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the law was motivated by invidious intent.259  Although the text of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) addresses discrimination, it 
neither defines “discrimination” nor specifically mentions indirect 
discrimination.260  Over a series of cases, however, the ECtHR has clarified 
that indirect discrimination can violate the ECHR regardless of whether the 
law stemmed from invidious intentions.261  For example, in Hoogendijk v. 
Netherlands,262 a facially neutral income requirement for disability benefits 
was found to burden women disproportionately.263  The court stated, “where 
a general policy or measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a 
particular group, it is not excluded that this may be regarded as 
discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed or directed at 
that group.”264  According to Hoogendijk, where an applicant is able to make 
a prima facie case of adverse effect, the respondent state actor bears the 
burden of justifying that effect.265  The ECtHR ultimately found that the 
disparate impact in Hoogendijk was justified.266 
The ECtHR later extended Hoogendijk’s reasoning to race in D.H. v. Czech 
Republic.267  In this case, the ECtHR found that the Czech government’s 
disproportionate assignment of Roma children to special education programs 
was a form of indirect discrimination that violated the ECHR.268  Once the 
claimants in D.H. proved a discriminatory effect based on the numbers of 
Roma children in special-education schools, the burden shifted to the 
government to justify the discrimination pursuant to the same standard of 
review that the ECtHR applies to direct racial and ethnic discrimination.269  
 
 259. See infra notes 263–72 and accompanying text. 
 260. Article 14 of the ECHR states, “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with 
a national minority, property, birth or other status.” The Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  Article 1 
of the ECHR’s Protocol No. 12 states, “The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.” Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 2000, E.T.S. 177.  
 261. See infra notes 261–71 and accompanying text. 
 262. App. No. 58641/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005), http://echr.ketse.com/doc/58641.00-en-
20050106/view/ [https://perma.cc/R66H-K6XT]. 
 263. Id. at 21–22.  
 264. Id.  
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. D.H. v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007), http://hudoc.echr. 
coe.int/eng?i=001-83256 [https://perma.cc/7MBS-JAM2]; see also OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, 
EUR. COMM’N, THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
29 (2011) (discussing the relationship between D.H. and Hoogendijk). 
 268. D.H., App. No. 57325/00 paras. 187–95. 
 269. With respect to both direct and indirect racial discrimination, the ECtHR asks whether 
the government policy under review has a “legitimate aim” and whether there is a “reasonable 
relationship of proportionality” between the law and that aim. Id. paras. 195–96, 208.  Many 
commentators have recognized D.H. as a landmark case because it made clear the ECtHR’s 
view that disparate impact could constitute impermissible discrimination regardless of whether 
there is discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Rory O’Connell, Substantive Equality in the European 
2017] EQUAL PROTECTION & GLOBAL CONVERGENCE 1283 
The ECtHR reiterated that it did not require any finding of discriminatory 
intent.270  ECtHR cases after D.H. have confirmed that the gap between overt 
discrimination and disparate impact has closed.271  In bridging this gap, D.H. 
cited legal developments across Europe and at the United Nations as 
persuasive authority to show growing recognition that direct and indirect 
discrimination are similarly injurious.272 
Finally, in the sodomy case of Leung v. Secretary for Justice,273 the Hong 
Kong High Court of Appeal demonstrated that Hong Kong’s constitutional 
law protects people against both direct and indirect discrimination.274  This 
case concerned a criminal provision that set the age of consent for sodomy 
higher than the age of consent for vaginal intercourse.275  The penalty for 
violating the age requirement for sodomy was also much more severe.276  The 
government argued that the disparate age-of-consent laws did not 
discriminate based on sexual orientation because the harsher regulation of 
sodomy applied to both same-sex couples and different-sex couples who 
engage in sodomy.277  The Court rejected this contention.278  It reasoned that 
harsher regulation of sodomy does in fact discriminate based on sexual 
 
Court of Human Rights?, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 129, 131 (2009); Julie Suk, 
Disparate Impact Abroad, in A NATION OF WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES?:  THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT AT 50, at 283, 294 (Ellen D. Katz & Samuel R. Bagenstos eds., 2015). 
 270. D.H., App. No. 57325/00 paras. 184, 194. 
 271. See Lavida v. Greece, App. No. 7973/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe. 
int/eng?i=001-120188 [https://perma.cc/4MZN-KQVD] (examining a facially neutral policy 
that disproportionately impacted Roma schoolchildren); Horvath & Kiss v. Hungary, App. No. 
11146/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-116124 
[https://perma.cc/M5S7-UD4P] (same). 
 272. The ECtHR cited nonbinding authority from other branches of the Council of Europe, 
the Court of Justice of the European Community (now the European Court of Justice), and 
member states’ domestic legal developments. See D.H., App. No. 57325/00, pts. III–VI.  
Interestingly, the court also cited United States’ statutory ban on employment discrimination. 
Id. para. 107.  As discussed above, the United States handles disparate impact cases very 
differently in constitutional law as opposed to cases involving statutory protections against 
discrimination. See supra note 11. 
 273. [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.A.). 
 274. While Hong Kong’s statutory bans on discrimination explicitly bar indirect 
discrimination, Hong Kong’s constitutional texts (i.e., the Basic Law and Bill of Rights 
Ordinance) do not expressly address indirect discrimination. Carole J. Petersen, Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity in Hong Kong:  A Case for the Strategic Use of Human Rights 
Treaties and the International Reporting Process, 14 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 28, 46–51 
(2013).  In the case of Leung, however, the judiciary interpreted constitutional law to prohibit 
indirect discrimination as well. Leung, 4 H.K.L.R.D. paras 134–35. According to one 
commentator, Leung’s conceptualization of indirect discrimination is more capacious than that 
in Hong Kong’s statutory antidiscrimination laws. See Petersen, supra, at 50 n.128. 
 275. The age of consent for “buggery” (i.e., sodomy) between men was twenty-one. Leung, 
4 H.K.L.R.D. para. 6. A parallel provision criminalized buggery between different-sex 
partners with a female under twenty-one. Id.  Interestingly, the parallel provision on 
heterosexual buggery did not stipulate any age of consent for the male partner. See id.  
Meanwhile, the age of consent for vaginal sex was sixteen. Id. para. 9. 
 276. See id. paras. 6–9 (noting that violating the age of consent for sodomy could result in 
life imprisonment, whereas violating the age consent for vaginal sex was only punishable by 
imprisonment up to five years). 
 277. Id. para. 48. 
 278. Id.  
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orientation because it “significantly affects homosexual men in an adverse 
way compared with heterosexuals.  The impact on the former group is 
significantly greater than on the latter.”279 
From the U.S. perspective, it is noteworthy that Leung did not require a 
finding of invidious intent to determine that the disparate impact in that case 
constituted sexual-orientation discrimination.280  It came to this conclusion 
even though, like the U.S. Constitution, the equality provision in the Hong 
Kong bill of rights does not expressly state that indirect discrimination is 
impermissible.281  Once the court found there to be sexual-orientation 
discrimination, it applied the same rigorous review that it would have applied 
to direct discrimination.282  Leung has helped to shape Hong Kong’s legal 
landscape beyond sexual-orientation discrimination cases.  As explained by 
Carole Petersen, an expert on Hong Kong’s equality laws, “This [case] was 
highly significant, not only for gay men, but also for others who may seek to 
rely upon the concept of indirect discrimination when challenging statutes 
and government policies that apply to all, but have a disproportionate and 
adverse affect [sic] on one group.”283 
Recently, in Leung Chun Kwong v. Secretary for the Civil Service,284 the 
High Court’s Court of First Instance reiterated that “equality provisions in 
the Basic Law and Hong Kong Bill of Rights could be violated by either 
direct or indirect discrimination.”285  The court found that the government’s 
provision of spousal benefits for civil servants indirectly discriminated based 
on sexual orientation.286  Even though the government policy was neutral on 
its face, it created an adverse impact based on sexual orientation because the 
Hong Kong government did not recognize same-sex spouses.287  The Court 
ultimately found the discrimination to be unconstitutional.288 
The preceding examples illustrate that, in bridging the gap between facial 
discrimination and disparate impact, the United States is converging with 
Canada, South Africa, the Council of Europe, and Hong Kong.  In these 
foreign jurisdictions, courts made the normative decision to treat direct and 
indirect discrimination similarly because the two types of discrimination 
harm people in comparable ways.  The Canadian constitution, the ECHR, and 
 
 279. Id. 
 280. See id. 
 281. The Hong King Bill of Rights Ordinance states: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59, (1991) 1 O.H.K., § 22. 
 282. See Leung, 4 H.K.L.R.D. paras. 44–51 (applying the court’s standard proportionality 
test). 
 283. Petersen, supra note 274, at 50. 
 284. [2017] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 1132 (C.F.I.). 
 285. Id. para. 57. 
 286. Id. para. 58. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
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Hong Kong’s bill of rights do not expressly address indirect 
discrimination.289  Nonetheless, the courts interpreting these texts have 
decided that facial discrimination and disparate impact must be addressed 
similarly.290  While the South African constitution expressly protects people 
against indirect discrimination, the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
elaborated on indirect discrimination by clarifying that discriminatory motive 
need not underlie indirect discrimination for it be impermissible.291  Like 
these courts abroad, the Supreme Court must interpret an equal protection 
clause that is textually vague.  In doing so, the Court seems to be blurring the 
distinction between facial discrimination and disparate impact, as courts 
abroad already have. 
B.  Unitary Standards of Review 
The U.S. Supreme Court is also converging with foreign courts by 
collapsing its standards of review in equal protection cases.  The jurisdictions 
that we studied all apply a unitary standard to a wide range of discrimination 
cases, including cases based on race, sex, and sexual orientation.292  Viewing 
these jurisdictions from a higher level of abstraction, they arguably apply two 
standards of review:  one standard to discrimination based on personal traits 
such as race, sex, and sexual orientation293 and another to discrimination 
based on characteristics that courts have not considered to be deeply personal, 
such as differential treatment of military units or differential treatment based 
on residential location.294  Our focus here is on the former category of cases.  
As a de jure matter, the Supreme Court applies different tiers of review to 
discrimination cases in this first category.295  As a de facto matter, the United 
States is beginning to collapse its tiered framework into a unitary standard, 
while the foreign jurisdictions studied above already apply a unitary 
standard.296  The foreign jurisdictions discussed all refer to this unitary 
standard of review as a “proportionality analysis,” but that analysis manifests 
differently across jurisdictions.297 
 
 289. See supra notes 246, 249, 260 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 246, 249, 260 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra notes 252–58 and accompanying text. 
 292. We highlight foreign approaches to race, sex, and sexual orientation because cases 
concerning these statuses have become paradigmatic examples of tiered review in the United 
States. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
 293. See infra notes 310, 315–17, 327, 332 and accompanying text. 
 294. See, e.g., Kong Yunming v. Dir. of Soc. Welfare, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 950 
(C.F.A.) (addressing discrimination based on residency status); Beian v. Romania, App. No. 
30658/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-83822 
[https://perma.cc/PM2E-ADJQ] (addressing differential treatment of military units). 
 295. See supra note 143–144 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra Part II.B. 
 297. Commentators often trace these jurisdictions’ proportionality analysis to German 
roots.  Germany first developed proportionality analysis as a component of administrative law.  
Proportionality doctrine has since expanded to other doctrinal areas, including constitutional 
rights, and to other countries including the ones that this Article studies.  For background on 
the German roots of proportionality doctrines, see Moshe Cohen-Aliya & Iddo Porat, 
American Balancing and German Proportionality:  The Historic Origins, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
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In Canadian constitutional law, section 1 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms makes clear that constitutional rights are not 
absolute.298  In the seminal case of R. v. Oakes,299 the Supreme Court of 
Canada developed the proportionality analysis that it uses in most cases to 
determine whether a rights infringement is justified.300  Oakes itself was not 
an equality case, but the court has since extended the Oakes test to equality 
jurisprudence.301 
In equality cases, the Supreme Court of Canada will first ask whether the 
state has discriminated—either directly or indirectly—based on protected 
grounds.302  If there is discrimination, the court will evaluate whether the 
discrimination can be justified.303  In accordance with Oakes, the 
discriminatory measure can be justified only if it is proportionally related to 
achieving a “pressing and substantial” government objective.304  To satisfy 
the proportionality requirement, (1) the discriminatory measure must be 
rationally connected to the government objective, (2) it should impair 
protected rights as little as possible, and (3) there must be proportionality 
between the deleterious effects of the discriminatory measure and the 
objective served.305  The court will analyze each of these steps 
sequentially.306  The third step of this analysis requires the court to consider 
how harmful the discrimination is.307  If the government deprives people of 
 
263, 263 (2010); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 98–111 (2008). 
 298. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 1, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K) (“The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”). 
 299. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). 
 300. Although the Supreme Court of Canada uses the Oakes test to analyze most disputes 
about constitutional rights, there are some contexts in which the Oakes test does not apply.  
See generally Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (Can.) (declining to apply the 
Oakes test to administrative law); R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 (Can.) (applying an analysis 
other than the Oakes test to a particular criminal context). 
 301. See generally Trociuk v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835 (Can.) 
(striking down a law that excluded a father’s information from his child’s birth registration); 
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Can.) (striking down Alberta’s Individual Rights 
Protection Act for excluding sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination).  
 302. See Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 153–54 (Can.).  Canada has 
recognized numerous protected grounds and subjects all of these grounds to the same analysis 
rather than different tiers of analysis.  In Canadian constitutional law, protected grounds of 
discrimination include race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability, sexual orientation, citizenship, marital status, and off-reserve aboriginal 
status. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).  For background on how these 
grounds were identified, see infra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 303. Andrews, 1 S.C.R. at 153–54. 
 304. See id. at 153. 
 305. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 105–06 (Can.); see also Reference re Pub. Serv. 
Emp. Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 373–74 (Can.) (restating the Oakes test).  For 
further discussion on applying the Oakes test to equality cases, see Fredman, supra note 234, 
at 72–73. 
 306. See Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 105. 
 307. This third step is sometimes referred to as evaluating “proportionality in the strict 
sense” or “proportionality in the narrow sense.” Sweet & Mathews, supra note 297, at 75, 105.  
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a particularly important right or benefit, the discrimination is especially 
harmful.308  Accordingly, the government will need to show that a 
correspondingly strong objective is being served by the discrimination.309 
Canadian courts apply the Oakes test to all protected categories of 
discrimination, including race, sex, and sexual orientation.310  The Charter 
on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms explicitly enumerates certain protected 
grounds of discrimination:  “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age or mental or physical disability.”311  In addition, the Canadian 
Supreme Court has identified sexual orientation, citizenship, marital status, 
and off-reserve aboriginal status as additional protected grounds.312  
Canadian constitutional law applies the Oakes test to all these different 
categories.313 
South Africa also eschews tiered review for a unitary proportionality 
analysis.314  The South African Constitutional Court has applied the same 
proportionality test to cases of race discrimination,315 sex discrimination,316 
and sexual-orientation discrimination.317  These categories of discrimination 
are among the sixteen categories explicitly protected by the South African 
constitution.318  The constitutional court has also expanded the list of 
 
For a discussion on the importance of this step, see id. at 75–76.  Sometimes commentators 
refer to this step as the fourth (as opposed to third) step in analysis because they count 
identification of a pressing and substantial government objective as the first step of analysis. 
See id. 
 308. See id. 
 309. See id. 
 310. See, e.g., Bear v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 3 F.C. 456 (Can.) (striking down 
an act that prohibited Indians from participating in a universal pension plan); M. v. H., [1999] 
2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) (striking down legal provisions that barred same-sex couples’ access to 
spousal support); Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358 (Can.) (striking 
down immigration regulations that discriminated against fathers because of sex stereotypes);. 
 311. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 312. The Supreme Court of Canada refers to these protected grounds as “analogous” 
protected grounds, as opposed to “enumerated” protected grounds. See generally Corbiere v. 
Canada (Minister of Indian and N. Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (Can.) (off-reserve aboriginal 
status); Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.) (sexual orientation); Miron v. Trudel, 
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (Can.) (marital status); Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
143 (Can.) (citizenship).  A common theme among the enumerated and analogous grounds of 
protection is that “they often serve as the basis for stereotypical decisions made not on the 
basis of merit but on the basis of a personal characteristic that is immutable or changeable only 
at unacceptable cost to personal identity.” Corbiere, 2 S.C.R. at 206. 
 313. See Fredman, supra note 234, at 72–73; supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
 314. See Fredman, supra note 234, at 35–36. 
 315. City Council v. Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) (S. Afr.) para. 81 (holding that a 
policy of selective enforcement of debt recovery amounted to unfair race discrimination). 
 316. President v. Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) (S. Afr.) para. 2 (upholding a policy 
giving the president authority to grant incarcerated mothers prison sentence remissions). 
 317. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.) (concluding that 
barring same-sex couples from marrying violated constitutional rights to equality and dignity). 
 318. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, § 9 (listing protection categories including race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth). 
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protected grounds through case law.319  The proportionality test is a unitary 
standard that applies to all of these different categories of discrimination.320 
There are differences between Canada’s and South Africa’s 
proportionality tests.  Unlike the Oakes test, which requires analyzing 
proportionality through a series of discrete steps,321 South Africa’s 
proportionality test is a “single-stage, multi-factored balancing” exercise.322  
The Constitutional Court of South Africa first developed its proportionality 
test in a case challenging the death penalty as violating South Africa’s post-
Apartheid interim constitution’s ban on cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
punishment.323 
Subsequently, South Africa enshrined the constitutional court’s 
proportionality test in the “Limitation of Rights” section of the post-
Apartheid final constitution, and the proportionality test now applies to 
equality cases.324  The constitution lays out five factors that should be 
weighed to determine whether an infringement of equality rights is 
justified.325 
The European Court of Human Rights has also adopted a proportionality 
analysis for equality cases.  Discrimination violates article 14 of the ECHR 
“if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised.”326  In analyzing proportionality, the ECtHR will 
usually require “very weighty reasons” to justify discrimination on grounds 
of race, sex, sexual orientation, nationality, religion, and nonmarital birth.327  
 
 319. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. S. African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (recognizing 
discrimination based on HIV status as a protected category). 
 320. See Fredman, supra note 234, at 35–36. 
 321. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 105–06 (Can.); Sweet & Mathews, supra note 
316, at 117. 
 322. See Sweet & Mathews, supra note 297, at 127. 
 323. See S. v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 324. The Constitution of South Africa does not use the term “proportionality,” but it 
requires a balancing of five factors in its Limitation of Rights Clause. See S. AFR. CONST., 
1996 ch. 2, § 36. 
 325. The five factors to be weighed include the nature of the right, the importance of the 
purpose of limiting the right, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relation between the 
limitation and its purpose, and the existence of less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
Id. 
 326. Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas v. Austria, App. No. 40825/98 para. 87 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-88022 [https://perma.cc/HJ69-
S2PC]; see also Belgian Linguistic Case, App. No. 1677/62, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 252 para. 10 
(1968) (providing an earlier articulation of the same test). 
 327. For elaboration on how requiring “very weighty reasons” for these categories of 
discrimination differs markedly from the United States’ rigid multitiered approach to 
categories of discrimination, see Aaron Baker, Proportional, Not Strict, Scrutiny:  Against a 
U.S. “Suspect Classifications” Model Under Article 14 ECHR in the U.K., 56 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 847, 888–89 (2008).  For further background on the “very weighty reasons” requirement, 
see Rory O’Connell, Cinderella Comes to the Ball:  Art. 14 and the Right to Non-
Discrimination in the ECHR, 29 LEGAL STUD. 211, 214 (2009).  For a case acknowledging 
that “very weighty reasons” are required to justify differential treatment based on religion, sex, 
sexual orientation, birth status, and nationality, see Vojnity v. Hungary, App. No. 29617/07 
para. 36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-116409 
[https://perma.cc/N7JG-98KM]. 
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The ECtHR has also identified additional factors for calibrating the 
proportionality analysis.  For example, it will defer more to state 
governments through its doctrine of “margin of appreciation” if the 
challenged law deals primarily with economic policy.328  The ECtHR will 
also defer more to state governments if the legal challenge concerns an area 
of policy-making about which there is little sign of consensus among 
European states.329  For the purposes of this Article’s comparisons with the 
United States, it is worth underscoring the fact that the ECtHR applies the 
same proportionality analysis to discrimination based on different personal 
traits including race, sex, or sexual orientation.330 
Hong Kong also applies a unitary standard of review for constitutional 
equality cases concerning personal characteristics.  In Secretary for Justice 
v. Yau,331 which addressed disparate criminalization of public sex based on 
sexual orientation, Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal stated that 
discrimination based on race, sex, and sexual orientation are all subject to the 
same proportionality analysis, which requires “intense scrutiny” of 
discrimination.332  Bearing some similarity to the Canadian test discussed 
above, the proportionality test in Yau dictates that, in order for discrimination 
to be justified, the difference in treatment must (1) “pursue a legitimate aim”; 
(2) “be rationally connected to the legitimate aim”; and (3) “be no more than 
is necessary to accomplish the legitimate aim.”333  The court subsequently 
clarified that this proportionality review extends to discrimination based on 
other personal characteristics as well, such as religion, politics, and social 
 
 328. See, e.g., Stec v. United Kingdom, App. No. 65731/01 para. 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2006), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-73198 [https://perma.cc/Q78P-VYV6] (stating that state 
policies concerning macroeconomics, including social security policies, warrant deference 
through the margin of appreciation doctrine).  See generally HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE 
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE (1996). 
 329. See, e.g., Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04 para. 105 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-99605 [https://perma.cc/7AKP-SHPJ] (adjusting the 
court’s analysis of sexual-orientation discrimination based on the lack of consensus 
concerning same-sex marriage); see also Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and 
the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 
1730, 1734–45 (2011); Holning Lau, Comparative Perspectives on Strategic Remedial 
Delays, 91 TUL. L. REV. 259, 271–72, 312–15 (2016). 
 330. See Baker, supra note 327, at 888–89 (contrasting the ECtHR’s proportionality 
analysis with traditional tiered review in the United States).  Although the ECtHR applies the 
same proportionality analysis to different personal traits, the court’s deference to states 
through its consensus doctrine may end up ratcheting down the intensity of review for personal 
traits that are arguably more controversial, such as sexual orientation.  For example, even 
though the ECtHR has said that it usually requires “very weighty reasons” to justify sexual 
orientation discrimination, this demand for rigorous review has been countered by the court’s 
deference to states on the issue of same-sex marriage due to the lack of European consensus 
on same-sex marriage. See Chapin & Charpentier v. France, App. No. 40183/07 para. 51 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163436 [https://perma.cc/C2MG-UVA8] 
(reiterating the holding from Schalk & Kopf because there was still no consensus regarding 
same-sex marriage); Schalk & Kopf, App. No. 30141/04 para. 105 (holding that the ECtHR’s 
protection of equality does not require states to allow same-sex marriage). 
 331. Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo, [2007] 10 H.K.C.F.A.R. 335 (C.F.A.). 
 332. Id. paras. 20–21. 
 333. Id. para. 20. 
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origin.334  It stated, however, that a less rigorous standard of review would 
apply to differential treatment based on factors that it did not consider 
personal characteristics, such as the location of one’s residency.335 
In sum, the four jurisdictions we studied all apply a single standard of 
review—a unitary proportionality analysis—to cases concerning 
discrimination based on personal characteristics.  These jurisdictions have 
been aware that the United States’ multitiered system exists as an alternative 
approach, but they have chosen a unitary and flexible proportionality analysis 
instead.336  Consider, for example, a speech that Canadian Chief Justice 
Beverley McLachlin delivered at a judicial colloquium at the Hong Kong 
Court of Final Appeal in 2015.337  Chief Justice McLachlin directly 
contrasted Canada’s approach to constitutional law with that of the United 
States, which relies more on rigid categories.338  In U.S. equal protection 
cases, this means separating different types of discrimination by category and 
applying a different legal test to each category.339 
Chief Justice McLachlin acknowledged that proponents of the United 
States’ approach believe that the U.S approach “offers more certainty and 
provides less scope for judicial law-making.”340  She argued, however, that 
 
 334. Fok Chun Wa v. Hosp. Auth., [2012] 15 H.K.C.F.A.R. 409 para. 5 (C.F.A.) (drawing 
a distinction between discrimination based on “core-values, including those relating to 
personal or human characteristics such as race, colour, gender, sexual orientation, religion, 
politics or social origin” and discrimination based on other grounds including residency status, 
which was at issue in the instant case). 
 335. See id.; Kong Yunming v. Dir. of Soc. Welfare, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 950 paras. 
40–41 (C.F.A.).  It is worth noting that, in 2016, the Court of Final Appeal modified its 
proportionality test in the context of protecting constitutional property rights. See Hysan Dev. 
Co. v. Town Planning Bd., [2016] 19 H.K.C.F.A.R. 372 paras. 64–88 (C.F.A.).  The Court of 
Final Appeal added an additional step to proportionality analysis, so the test now operates even 
more similarly to the Canadian Oakes test. Id.  Whether Hong Kong courts will apply this 
revised proportionality test to equality cases is yet to be seen.  In at least one case, the Court 
of First Instance has signaled that the modified test in Hysan should be applied in equality 
cases. See Leung Chun Kwong v. Sec’y for the Civil Serv., [2017] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 1132 para. 
36 (C.F.I.).  But see Kelley Loper, Constitutional Adjudication and Substantive Gender 
Equality in Hong Kong, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM:  GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 149, 157–
58 (Beverley Baines et al. eds., 2012) (contending that, in Hong Kong, the doctrinal test for 
justifying differential treatment might differ from proportionality tests with respect to 
infringement of other constitutional rights). 
 336. Indeed, the jurisdictions that we studied regularly cite U.S. precedent, but they have 
chosen not to adopt the United States’ tiered approach to equal protection. Cf. Liptak, supra 
note 225 (noting that courts around the world have looked to the U.S. Supreme Court for 
inspiration, but have become, over time, less influenced by U.S. jurisprudence). 
 337. See Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Can., Address at the 
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Judicial Colloquium 2015:  Proportionality, Justification, 
Evidence and Deference:  Perspectives from Canada (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.hkcfa.hk/ 
en/documents/publications/speeches_articles/index.html [https://perma.cc/9KUU-DTB5]. 
 338. See id. at 10–11. 
 339. For background on this U.S. approach, see supra Part I.B.  Outside the equal protection 
context, some other components of U.S. constitutional doctrine involve even stricter 
categorical tests. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (using a 
bright-line rule to define incitement of imminent unlawful action as a category of speech 
unprotected by the First Amendment). 
 340. McLachlin, supra note 337, at 10. 
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“these advantages may be more apparent than real.”341  Although Chief 
Justice McLachlin was speaking about U.S. constitutional law in general, her 
critique seems especially apt with respect to equal protection.342  As 
discussed in Part II.B, the United States’ tiered approach has failed to cabin 
judicial discretion in ways that would render constitutional law more 
predictable and certain.343  The Canadian approach embodied in the Oakes 
test gives judges more room to weigh competing interests on a case-by-case 
basis and prompts judges to be open and honest about what they are doing.344  
Chief Justice McLachlin explained that Canada’s flexible proportionality 
analysis “fosters transparency, accountability and trust.”345  Like Canada, the 
other three foreign jurisdictions discussed have also opted for a unitary 
proportionality analysis. 
III.  THE PATH AHEAD 
Our discussion thus far has been primarily descriptive.  We have mapped 
two trajectories in U.S. equal protection doctrine and illustrated these 
trajectories’ convergence with foreign law.  In this Part, we turn to the 
prescriptive question:  What should be the significance of these developments 
going forward?  We contend that, in future equal protection cases, the U.S. 
Supreme Court should engage foreign law much more directly and 
transparently.  Doing so should encourage the United States to continue 
bridging the gap between facial discrimination and disparate impact and to 
continue collapsing tiered review.  Foreign law should also inform the United 
States as it deliberates further about the standard of review that should replace 
tiered review. 
This Part then draws on theoretical literature about judicial decision-
making to develop three arguments about engaging foreign law in future 
equal protection jurisprudence.  We refer to these three claims as (1) 
promoting judicial candor, (2) leveraging collective wisdom, and (3) learning 
from foreign jurisdictions as laboratories of doctrinal innovation.  We will 
also address counterarguments that criticize judicial consideration of foreign 
law. 
A.  Judicial Candor 
The current trajectories in U.S. law might already be informed by Supreme 
Court Justices’ appreciation of foreign developments.  It is possible that 
foreign law has inspired and influenced Supreme Court Justices, but that they 
 
 341. Id. 
 342. See id. at 10–11. 
 343. See supra notes 149–68 and accompanying text. 
 344. For our earlier discussion on the Oakes test’s sequence of steps, see supra notes 300–
13 and accompanying text. 
 345. McLachlin, supra note 337, at 14; see also DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE 
OF LAW 159–88 (2004) (praising Oakes’s structured proportionality test); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3113–14 (2015) (same). 
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are choosing to omit explicit references to foreign law.346  Over a decade ago, 
the Supreme Court did overtly cite foreign law in some high-profile 
constitutional cases.347  For example, to support striking down Texas’s ban 
on same-sex sodomy in Lawrence, the Court cited the ECtHR, laws of United 
Kingdom, and an amicus brief surveying laws worldwide.348  Likewise, in 
Roper v. Simmons,349 the Court cited legal developments around the world to 
support striking down the juvenile death penalty.350  These references to 
foreign law unleashed strong responses from critics, including dissenting 
Justices, who believed that foreign law should never be consulted in 
constitutional adjudication.351  Perhaps this criticism has made Justices shy 
about openly referencing foreign law.  Some Justices may continue to be 
inspired and influenced by foreign law, but they may choose to obscure those 
sources by not citing them.352 
Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that Justices continue to be well 
aware of foreign constitutional doctrine.  First, in constitutional cases over 
the past decade, the Justices have frequently received amicus briefs that 
present arguments based on foreign law.353  Second, Justices often spend time 
speaking with foreign jurists at international events, such as conferences and 
summer teaching collaborations.354  Third, some Justices have openly 
supported learning from foreign jurisdictions.  For example, in public 
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 350. See id. at 575–77. 
 351. See, e.g., id. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that foreign and international law 
have no place in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); Robert H. Bork, Has the Supreme Court 
Gone Too Far?, COMMENTARY, Oct. 2003, at 32 (calling the Supreme Court’s citation to 
foreign law “absurd” and “flabbergasting.”); Robert H. Bork, Whose Constitution Is It, 
Anyway?, NAT’L REV., Dec. 8, 2003, at 37 [hereinafter Bork, Whose Constitution]. 
 352. At least one law review article has cited anonymous federal judges saying that they 
consciously avoid citing international law to avoid blowback. John Coyle, The Case for 
Writing International Law into the U.S. Code, 56 B.C. L. REV. 433, 476 n.220 (2015).   
 353. See, e.g., Brief for 54 International and Comparative Law Experts from 27 Countries 
and the Marriage and Family Law Research Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 1, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) 
(citing jurisprudence from South Africa, Canada, the ECtHR, and others); Brief for Foreign 
and Comparative Law Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Obergefell, 135 
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Supreme Court Justices “confer with members of constitutional courts in other countries [at 
conferences and other meetings] and have spoken of the need to incorporate comparative 
constitutional law into American constitutional law” (footnote omitted)).  
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speeches, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg have both spoken in favor of learning 
from foreign law.355 
If Justices are in fact inspired by foreign jurisprudence, they should be 
frank about it.  They should not obscure what they are doing by omitting 
citations to foreign law.  By and large, commentators have recognized the 
importance of judicial candor.356  Judicial candor is important to the principle 
of publicity, which entails providing explanations to the public.357  The 
public is entitled to know the background of judicial decisions to facilitate 
discussions and debates about the merits of the decisions.358  The Court 
should therefore transparently defend drawing inspiration from abroad.  As 
discussed in Parts III.B and C, there are principled reasons for drawing on 
foreign law specifically in the context of equal protection. 
Judicial candor is important not only to facilitate public debate, but also 
because candor is essential to trust and institutional integrity.  Judicial 
transparency about reasoning and sources of law establishes a “background 
norm of truthfulness” that is essential to upholding the integrity of the 
judiciary.359  If we do not expect judicial candor when it comes to drawing 
from foreign laws, there could be a slippery slope, whereby judges feel they 
can distort their motivations in other ways to achieve their desired results.  
Such distortions would further undermine judicial integrity.360 
To be sure, commentators have recognized some exceptional 
circumstances under which judicial candor should not be expected.361  For 
example, if being candid about judicial reasoning would somehow undermine 
national security or cause extreme backlash that threatens the judiciary’s 
independence, candor should not be expected.362  Such severe threats, 
however, are generally not at issue when it comes to being candid about citing 
foreign law. 
Of course, while we speculate that sitting Justices have drawn some 
inspiration from abroad in developing recent U.S. jurisprudence that 
converges with foreign law, we must emphasize that we do not know if this 
is in fact the case.  To the extent that the Justices have been drawing 
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 361. See, e.g., Delaney, supra note 356, at 14–15. 
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inspiration from abroad, however, we contend that they should be more 
transparent about this influence. 
B.  Collective Wisdom 
Even if the Supreme Court Justices were not influenced by foreign law in 
developing the doctrinal trajectories that we discussed, they should engage 
with foreign law more directly in the future.  One reason for doing so is the 
value of collective wisdom.  The more that peer jurisdictions approach a 
particular question the same way, the more likely that approach will be 
correct.363  Jeremy Waldron has referred to this as the “force of numbers” 
when he explained reasons the United States should learn from foreign 
law.364  Aristotle articulated a version of this claim when he explained that 
there are benefits to the “wisdom of multitudes.”365  The same sentiment is 
also captured by the old adage “two heads are better than one”366 and the 
phrase “wisdom of crowds,” which James Surowiecki popularized to 
describe the superiority of aggregated wisdom of a group—even a small 
group—over that of individuals.367 
To understand why aggregated wisdom is persuasive, one can consider 
Waldron’s analogy between law and science.368  If the United States were to 
address a difficult public health question, such as an epidemic, it would 
certainly look at how other countries have addressed the same epidemic.369  
The United States should not simply mimic other countries’ responses 
because the epidemic might manifest differently in the United States, but it 
would be irresponsible for the United States not to leverage the accumulated 
wisdom of foreign countries.370  At the very least, if the United States is 
leaning toward a particular approach, it can find reassurance in knowing that 
foreign countries have chosen the same approach after examining the 
problem from various vantage points.371  Of course, when looking abroad, 
the United States should set its sights on trustworthy findings.372  As Waldron 
put it, U.S. scientists “would not look to the work of suspect or disreputable 
laboratories.”373 
 
 363. See JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”:  FOREIGN LAW 
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In the equal protection context, Waldron’s analogy is particularly apt.  
Many countries face the same generic problem:  how to conceptualize 
constitutional protections of equality when the relevant constitutional 
provisions are textually vague.374  It would make sense for the United States 
to learn from the peer jurisdictions that we studied because they are reputable 
jurisdictions, known for successfully implementing rule of law and liberal 
constitutional regimes.375  In other words, they are not “suspect or 
disreputable laboratories.”376  The United States should find reassurance in 
the fact that these jurisdictions have reached a consensus about treating 
disparate impact like facial discrimination and rejecting tiered scrutiny.377  
While the United States has taken the first few steps in bridging facial 
discrimination and disparate impact and collapsing tiered scrutiny, the 
accumulated wisdom from reputable peer jurisdictions should make the 
United States feel more confident about continuing on its current path.378  
Foreign experience thus performs a confirmatory function. 
The collective wisdom of a group is particularly persuasive when the group 
shares relevant similarities.379  Youngjae Lee’s hypothetical “Dignity 
Society” helps to elucidate this idea.380  Imagine that we are part of this club 
because we place a high value on human dignity, as do all the other members 
of the club.381  Indeed, the club consists of like-minded individuals.382  If 
other people in the group reach a consensus that conflicts with our own stance 
on an issue, that should give us reason to reconsider our own position.383  
Likewise, as Youngjae Lee has noted, “if [we are] unsure about a moral issue 
that implicates dignity concerns, . . . [we] could come to a tentative 
conclusion about the issue and then seek to confirm it with others in the 
Society.”384  Furthermore, Lee explained:  “We all have experiences of 
consulting members of various groups we belong to in order to test our 
intuitions about one matter or another.  So this is one context in which 
‘consensus’ is epistemically significant.”385 
While Lee’s hypothetical involves individuals in a club, it is a metaphor 
for jurisdictions that belong to a shared school of thought.  The United States 
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is in a club of sorts, to which Canada, South Africa, the Council of Europe, 
and Hong Kong also belong.  Courts in each of these jurisdictions have placed 
great weight on human dignity and liberal constitutionalism.386  Accordingly, 
the club’s emerging consensus on equality doctrine should bear 
epistemological weight on individual club members, including the United 
States.387  To be sure, there are many illiberal jurisdictions around the world 
that have not taken equal protection seriously, but “force in numbers” among 
those jurisdictions should not be assigned persuasive weight. 
We recognize that there is already robust debate within U.S. legal 
scholarship about whether to bridge facial discrimination and disparate 
impact and collapse the tiers of scrutiny.388  It is beyond this Article’s scope 
to fully engage that existing body of literature.  Rather, our aim is to fill a gap 
in the domestic discourse.  Our point is that the collective wisdom of foreign 
jurisdictions should be a factor that informs debate within the United States 
but that such consideration has been missing. 
In sum, collective wisdom of foreign jurisdictions should encourage the 
United States to continue along its path of bridging facial discrimination and 
disparate impact and collapsing tiered review of discrimination based on 
personal characteristics.  Like the Supreme Court, courts in peer jurisdictions 
have given meaning to concepts such as equality and discrimination, which 
are not defined neatly by their respective constitutions (or, in the case of the 
European Court of Human Rights, its treaty).  The fact that the United States’ 
recent steps toward doctrinal reform and peer jurisdictions’ approaches to 
equality converge should reassure the United States that its emerging 
conceptualization of equality is proper. 
C.  Laboratories for Experimentation 
While aggregate wisdom has persuasive value, individual foreign 
jurisdictions also provide helpful information.  This is because, as Judge 
Richard Posner has explained, “Just as our states are laboratories for social 
experiments from which other states and the federal government can learn, 
so are foreign nations laboratories from whose legal experiments we can 
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learn.”389  Sometimes, laboratories replicate each other’s findings, and there 
is persuasive value to that aggregate information.  We discussed such 
aggregate wisdom in the preceding section.  Even if laboratories yield 
divergent results, we can learn from those results.390 
If the United States continues down the path of collapsing tiered review in 
equal protection, foreign jurisdictions could serve as a helpful resource 
because they have been laboratories for experimentation.  In Part I.A, we 
explained that, as a de facto matter, the Supreme Court seems to have 
collapsed tiered review into four factors that it uses to determine whether 
discrimination violates equal protection.  We acknowledged, however, that 
the jurisprudence has yet to crystalize.391  The Court has never explicitly 
articulated a de jure four-part test.  Hopefully, the Court will soon offer 
clarification by expressly articulating a legal standard to replace tiered 
review.  In doing so, the Court ought to draw from foreign experiences to 
strengthen its reasoning. 
Although the four jurisdictions that we studied have all rejected multitiered 
review, they have adopted different versions of proportionality analysis in its 
place.392  The United States ought to consider the advantages and drawbacks 
of these approaches as potential alternatives to the multifactor balancing act 
that we see currently emerging.393  As Waldron explained, examining the 
experiences of foreign courts help judges in “exploring the options [available 
to them], and considering various possible models of analysis.”394  The 
United States should not feel pressured to adopt doctrinal innovation from 
abroad.  However, if the Court considers a range of alternative options and 
then explains why it ultimately chooses the doctrinal framework that it does, 
such a practice would enhance the Court’s reasoning and transparency.395 
It is beyond this Article’s scope to propose any specific standard of review 
to replace tiered analysis in the United States.  We do, however, wish to offer 
a few thoughts about how the United States ought to engage the potential 
models developed abroad.  The Court should not limit itself to citing foreign 
law only if it adopts a foreign doctrinal framework.396  Instead, if the Court 
rejects alternative doctrinal frameworks developed abroad, it should explain 
that rejection.397  For example, if the United States chooses not to adopt a 
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sequential proportionality analysis such as Canada’s Oakes test, it would be 
helpful to hear why.398  Such transparent reasoning would enhance the depth 
and persuasiveness of U.S. jurisprudence. 
South Africa’s landmark death penalty case, S. v. Makwanyane,399 
illustrates the approach to comparative analysis we recommend.400  In 
analyzing whether the death penalty should be unconstitutional, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa referenced death penalty jurisprudence 
from Botswana, Canada, ECtHR, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, 
Jamaica, Tanzania, the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the 
United States, and Zimbabwe.401  The court’s opinion explained why certain 
foreign approaches were not well suited for South Africa.402  In particular, 
the court rejected U.S. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as being 
inappropriate for South Africa.403  Makwanyane’s comparative analysis has 
been heralded as a model of juridical sophistication.404  The thoroughness of 
the court’s analysis enhanced its persuasiveness.  Similarly, the United States 
could enhance its equal protection jurisprudence by considering foreign 
doctrinal frameworks and thoroughly explaining why—or why not—such 
foreign developments are suitable for the United States. 
D.  Addressing Criticisms 
Some commentators have adamantly opposed consulting foreign sources 
when interpreting the Constitution.405  While it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to completely rehash the debate about whether U.S. courts should cite 
foreign law, this Part briefly addresses what we perceive to be the three most 
common arguments against citing foreign law in constitutional cases.  These 
critiques center around concerns about (1) originalism, (2) opportunism, and 
(3) cultural particularism. 
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Some commentators oppose citing foreign law because they believe doing 
so undermines originalism.406  Other commentators, however, have 
demonstrated that it is not at all clear that the framers of the Constitution 
would have opposed subsequent generations of Americans referring to 
foreign law for inspiration.407  With regard to equal protection, specifically, 
original meaning is elusive and renders originalism indeterminate.408  Indeed, 
some legal historians have argued that the framers and the public originally 
understood the Equal Protection Clause to be intentionally vague, thus 
deferring the development of a specific definition to future generations.409  
Because both the text and original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause 
are vague, the Court must give meaning to equal protection through judicially 
crafted principles.410  In doing so, foreign law can be a helpful source of 
persuasive authority.411 
The second basis of opposition to foreign law is a fear of opportunism.  
Because there are so many jurisdictions around the world, a U.S. judge can 
probably find some support somewhere in the world for any position that the 
judge wants to adopt.412  As a result, some skeptics fear judges citing foreign 
law opportunistically, without any rhyme or reason other than to support their 
preferred positions.  This logic, however, presupposes that all foreign 
jurisdictions are equal and that choosing among them really is arbitrary.  To 
the contrary, this Article selected jurisdictions to study based on their status 
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as peer jurisdictions from various parts of the world.413  This status renders 
these jurisdictions particularly persuasive.414  Instead of starting with a 
preferred domestic outcome and looking abroad for support, our method was 
to first identify peer jurisdictions worth examining and then see what we 
might learn from their experiences.415  Judges can take the same approach, 
assuaging concerns that citation of foreign law is an opportunistic endeavor. 
The third critique of citing foreign law is based on the belief that the U.S. 
constitutional law is culturally specific to the United States and, therefore, 
drawing inspiration from foreign sources of law is inappropriate.416  This 
critique is, however, weak with respect to the equal protection issues we have 
discussed.  As David Fontana suggested, comparative analysis should not 
raise concerns about U.S. particularism when the analysis “does not use 
comparative constitutional law in such a radical way as to displace the 
centrality of American sources.”417  This Article has advocated an approach 
that preserves the centrality of U.S. law.  We started by tracing the 
development of U.S. equal protection doctrine.  We then looked abroad to 
help us reflect on the current posture of U.S. doctrine.  We argued that foreign 
developments could play a confirmatory role in advancing U.S. doctrine 
along its current paths.  We also acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court 
may well reject doctrinal experiments from our foreign peers.  In sum, this 
Article has advocated a “refined comparativism” that is not at odds with U.S. 
cultural particularism. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has revealed and synthesized three emerging trajectories in 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.  First, the Court 
has taken a few initial steps toward blurring the line between cases of facial 
discrimination and cases of disparate impact.  Second, the Court has begun 
to collapse tiered review of discrimination based on personal characteristics.  
These two trajectories combine to produce a third trajectory:  the growing 
convergence between U.S. equal protection doctrine and equality 
jurisprudence from abroad.  The collective wisdom of foreign jurisdictions 
should encourage the United States to continue along its current trajectories 
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of doctrinal reform.  In devising a legal standard to replace tiered review, the 
United States could learn from various approaches adopted by foreign courts. 
The Court’s decision whether to continue bridging the impact-treatment 
divide and collapsing tiered review will impact many areas of ongoing 
controversy.  For example, these doctrinal trajectories should impact 
litigation challenging North Carolina’s moratorium on local governments 
enacting antidiscrimination ordinances.418  They should influence the ways 
we view the discriminatory impact of pending “bathroom bills.”419  Doctrinal 
reform should influence ongoing equal protection challenges to affirmative 
action programs.420  In addition, doctrinal reform may influence equal 
protection challenges to President Trump’s bans on immigration and 
travel.421 
At the outset, we noted that constitutional doctrine changes slowly and we 
acknowledged that the doctrinal trajectories we discussed are still in early 
stages of development.422  Whether the United States continues along the 
trajectories we traced may depend on the future composition of the Court.  
Justice Gorsuch recently filled the seat of the late Justice Antonin Scalia.423  
This change might not substantially alter the trajectory of equal protection 
doctrine because Justice Scalia was not in the majority in most of the cases 
that constitute the trend lines that we traced.424  Thus, the previous majorities 
are likely to remain intact. 
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If, however, any of the three eldest Justices on the Court—Justices 
Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Breyer—retire in the near future, that would give 
President Trump an opportunity to replace them with a Justice similar to 
Justice Scalia.425  This could potentially reverse the doctrinal trajectories that 
we discussed.  For example, Justice Scalia has adamantly called for 
adherence to rigid tiers of scrutiny.426  If multiple new Justices adopt that 
position, the collapse of tiered review may be halted.  While tectonic shifts 
in the Court’s composition are possible in the future, Justice Gorsuch’s new 
position alone will not dramatically shift the Court’s dynamics.  Barring such 
a dramatic shift, this Article seeks to provide judges, advocates, and 
commentators with a clearer view of the doctrinal reforms that are already 
underway, such that those reforms can be extended in future cases in the spirit 
of common law constitutionalism. 
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